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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses possible bilateral alternatives to a multilateral trade agreement 
in the light of the difficulties of reaching a successful conclusion to the Doha round. 
We analyse the economic impacts of three envisioned regional Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTAs), between EU and USA, EU and China and EU and Russia, and com-
pare them with the probable outcome of a Doha round. The analyses utilise a modi-
fied and updated version of the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) trade model together with the current database (version 
6) based on the year 2001. We find that bilateral free trade agreements with Russia, 
China and the United States each serve as a viable EU alternative to the currently 
stalled multilateral Doha Round, with EU welfare gains estimated at US$ 13.4 bn., 
US$ 4.6 bn. and US$ 3.5 bn. respectively. However, bilateral agreements are clearly 
‘second best’ in nature, as the benefits accrue to the trade agreement partners at the 
expense of the rest of the world. The global welfare impacts of the Russian, the Chi-
nese and the US FTAs are respectively US$ 1.8 bn., US$ 9.1 bn. and US$ -2.7 bn. 
compared with a global outcome of the Doha round estimated at US$ 87 bn. We con-
clude that a multilateral agreement remains the preferred option. 
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1. Introduction 
The slow progress of the Doha Round since its 2001 launch in Doha, and its collapse 
(or “suspension” or “time-out” as it is termed by some officials) in July 2006 have 
strengthened the interest in entering Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) or establish-
ing Free Trade Areas (FTAs). It is expected that such agreements generate alternative 
opportunities for increased trade and cooperation, yielding economic gains for the se-
lected participating economies and industries, as opposed to a multilateral pattern of 
benefits under the auspices of the WTO.   
 
Heightened interest in bilateral trade liberalisation approaches arises from a widely 
held perception that a multilateral liberalisation deal through the WTO is, at least for 
now, closed or precluded. In addition, many also feel that the negotiations have be-
come overly cumbersome and complicated, and have limited the possibilities for a 
positive and comprehensive outcome of the negotiations. Consequently, some gov-
ernments consider WTO article XXIV as the only viable option for further trade lib-
eralisation, despite the article’s “second best” status when compared with multilateral 
WTO-based solutions. 
 
Therefore, with the reduced and perhaps even questionable prospects of what the 
WTO actually can deliver, particularly in such areas as agriculture, services, invest-
ments and government procurement, the bilateral dialog between many of the world 
trading nations has intensified. The Free Trade Areas have regained momentum in 
terms of their numbers, and perhaps even more importantly, they seem to be broader 
in their coverage as compared to earlier free trade agreements. Agreements with ser-
vices provisions are increasingly common, and an increasing number of agreements 
contain trade provisions in areas not regulated multilaterally.  
 
Although the EU continues to hope for Doha round progress, there has been increas-
ing momentum in Europe for extending the number of bilateral trade agreements. The 
European Parliament, Prime Ministers and centrally placed policy makers have also 
discussed the option of establishing new bilateral trade agreements – one of them be-
ing a North Atlantic EU-US free trade area. In addition, the EU is discussing an EU-
Russian regional trade agreement. Finally, ongoing efforts to improve trade relations 
and cooperation between Asia and Europe are within the next 3-4 years expected to 
inspire stronger (political and industry) interests in entering into an EU-China bilat-
eral trade agreement.  
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The motivation for this paper is the ongoing discussion in the EU of the prospects for 
establishing Free Trade Areas around the world. In particular we study the impacts of 
‘at-the-border-components’ of EU entering separate free trade areas with the United 
States, Russia and China. We therefore restrict the analysis of the impacts of an 
elimination of all tariffs and export subsidies/taxes on all commodities between the 
members of the Free Trade Area. We thereby abstract from potentially more impor-
tant aspects related to liberalisation of trade in services and investment, financial 
market harmonisation, trade facilitation, competition policies etc. This means ignor-
ing important expected welfare gains from productivity boosts that such components 
of ‘modern free trade areas’ may bring.  
 
The questions we address in this paper are:  
• What are the likely impacts for European economy of ‘at-the-border-
engagement’ in FTA’s with the US, Russia and China (as compared to a mul-
tilateral agreement)?  
• What are the implications for individual EU members? 
• What are the worldwide consequences of the ‘at-the-border-engagement’ in 
FTA’s? 
 
Finally, we conclude the paper by discussing if the EU would still not gain more by 
continuing to push for a comprehensive multilateral trade agreement. As the analysis 
demonstrates: the gains from ‘at-the-border’ free trade agreements will only yield the 
European Union and the partner countries marginal economic gains. Reopening and 
concluding a comprehensive multilateral trade agreement will in the long run be of a 
more significant importance to global trade and welfare.  
A historical perspective 
Since the Second World War, various rounds of trade talks, from the 1947 talks in 
Geneva to the 1979 Tokyo Round, have elicited substantial progress towards global 
trade liberalisation, particularly in terms of tariff reductions. In the same period, 
world trade increased tremendously. By 2005 world merchandise exports had in-
creased to more than 10,000 billion US dollars and the average applied tariff on all 
goods was 3.7 percent for the United States, 4.2 percent for the European Union and 
3.1 percent for Japan. For China, Russia and India the average applied tariff on all 
goods was 10, 9.5 and 18.3 percent, respectively (WTO, 2006). 
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This sustained wave of increased trade and progressive trade liberalisation also coin-
cided two waves of regional trade arrangements. The first wave occurred during the 
early 1960s and 1970s. From the establishment of the European Common Market, it 
spread throughout Africa, Latin America and other parts of the developing world. The 
US was then a hegemon and a strong supporter of multilateralism. With the exception 
of the creation of the European Community, the US did not endorse the ‘regional ap-
proach’.  
 
The second wave started in the middle of the 1980s and substantially accelerated dur-
ing the mid-1990s (see figure 1 below). The second wave witnessed the US role as a 
promoter of bilateral agreements: FTAs with Israel and Canada, and a proposed hemi-
spheric FTA with the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. In 1994, The North 
American Free-Trade Area (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico was signed. At the 
same time, the European Union was enlarged to include Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and Finland. Later the EU entered the so-called European Agreements and 
recently the EU has been enlarged to include 12 Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries, resulting in a European Union now with 27 member states.  
 
This second wave seems to have been further encouraged by the slow progress and 
recent suspension of the WTO trade negotiations. Since the GATT’s 1947 creation, 
there have been 360 regional trade agreements, and 211 of these are currently regis-
tered with the WTO. Of these, 133 are free trade agreements and 11 are customs un-
ions (WTO, September 2006).  
 
A notable trend is a shift in the geographical composition of regional trade agree-
ments. While RTAs were traditionally signed by geographically proximate trade part-
ners (e.g. EU and NAFTA), more and more trade agreements are inter-regional in na-
ture. Examples are those between US and Australia (January 2005), EFTA and Chile 
(December 2004), and EC and South Africa (January 2000).   
 
Regional trade agreements among developing countries are also increasing. Of those 
reported as notified to the WTO and currently in force, 15 were notified during the 50 
years of the GATT, while the other 23 have been reported as notified in the 11 years 
since the establishment of the WTO. Further, the majority of these agreements, cur-
rently in force but not notified to the WTO, are between developing countries, i.e. an 
increasing number of South-South trade agreements under negotiations (WTO, Octo-
ber 2006).  
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Figure 1. Number of Regional Trade Agreements in force by date of entry into 
force 
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Source: WTO (2006).  
Examples of recent FTAs  
Since 2000, the United States has signed seven regional trade agreements (with Aus-
tralia, Bahrain, Chile, Jordan, Morocco, Oman and Singapore) and it is currently ne-
gotiating 16 new trade agreements with countries in South America, Asia as well as in 
the Middle East and Africa. This represents a significant increase in the number of US 
regional trade deals from the existing nine agreements (also counting NAFTA and Is-
rael) notified to the WTO. 
 
Australia is also among those countries giving a high priority to regional trade agree-
ments. In 2005, Australia formulated three new regional trade agreements (with the 
US, Thailand and Singapore), and is currently negotiating agreements with China, 
Malaysia and ASEAN, while an FTA with Japan is being planned. In total, Australia 
has by 2006 notified six goods regional trade agreements to the WTO. 
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In addition to the association agreements with a varied array of 12 countries/regions, 
the EU is currently negotiating or planning bilateral agreements with the following 
countries and blocs: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Syria, 
MERCOSUR, Russia and Canada. In total the EU has notified the WTO of 23 goods 
regional trade agreements. 
 
In July 2006, the European Commission announced that future EU/Russian 
cooperation efforts will include discussion of an EU-Russian free trade area. It is the 
ambition of the European Union to move towards a free-trade area to be completed 
once Russia accedes to the WTO - which after the US–Russian agreement in Novem-
ber 2006 might take place in 2007. 
 
In addition to these ongoing or planned bilateral trade agreements, many of the politi-
cal leaders in Europe, among them the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmus-
sen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have recently voiced the need for consid-
ering a “plan B” to the multilateral approach: more specifically, the possible consid-
eration of a trans-Atlantic EU-US free trade zone, should the Doha Round ultimately 
fail.2  
 
The issue of a free-trade zone between the EU and the US was discussed in the Euro-
pean Parliament, approving a resolution based on the Report on EU-US Transatlantic 
economic relations. The report calls for a transatlantic barrier-free market by 2015 
and recommends that by the June 2006 summit, the EU and US should agree to up-
date the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 and the Transatlantic Economic Partner-
ship of 1998. The report also recommends designing a new Transatlantic Partnership 
Agreement that leads to the achievement of a barrier-free transatlantic market by 2015 
and includes a 2010 accelerated target date for financial services and capital markets.3 
The report clearly states the need for a more visionary and strategic approach suggest-
                                                 
2 The first calls for negotiating a North Atlantic free trade agreement first came from the Canadian 
Prime Minister Chretien and in the spring of 1995 EU trade minister Sir Leon Brittan, British Prime 
Minister John Major, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and other high-ranging European offi-
cials endorsed the proposal. 
3 On the Doha Development Agenda the European Parliament urged the EU and the US to remain 
fully committed to the WTO multilateral negotiations and not to engage in competition for bilateral 
or regional trade agreements. It welcomed the agreement within the WTO framework on the defini-
tive elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies, including those in the form of food aid 
and other export refund systems, by 2013 and stresses that comparable progress has yet to be 
achieved in the areas of domestic support and market access.  
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ing the inclusion of competition policies, standardised corporate governance, com-
patible or common standards and more effective regulatory cooperation.   
The EU Parliament’s resolution indicates a need for broadening and deepening the 
existing cooperative framework between the EU and the US and suggests that such a 
barrier-free transatlantic market should encompass not only the ‘traditional commod-
ity trade issues’, but should also facilitate the need for cooperation in a number of 
new areas: 
 
• Reducing regulatory barriers and harmonising standards. Regulatory barri-
ers and non harmonised standards are seen as one of the most significant ob-
stacles to trade and investment between the EU and the US.  
 
• Stimulating open and competitive capital markets. Mutual recognition and 
gradual convergence of accounting standards based on reliable regulatory su-
pervision, will lead to reduced listing costs.  
 
• Spurring innovation and the development of technology. Promoting co-
operation in research and development and to pursue investment pro-
grammes, in certain fields. 
 
Additional to a possible FTA, and as expected, the EU and US discussed many other 
highly topical issues at the June 2006 summit. Issues included terrorism and the need 
to seek a successful and ambitious conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda by 
the end of 2006. There was also an agreement to strengthening efforts to reduce barri-
ers to transatlantic trade and investments.  
 
In addition to the above mentioned free-trade initiatives the EU and China are in dia-
logue to liberalise trade. As testament to China’s continued growth, integration, and 
increasing importance in world markets, EU and China will likely intensify efforts to 
tighten trade relations and economic cooperation. 
What is an FTA?  
A Free Trade Area is an agreement that grants each participant country/region free 
access to its partners’ markets but maintains sovereign trade policy towards non-
participants. This differs from a preferential trading arrangement under which partner 
countries impose lower tariffs on imports from each other than on imports from the 
outside world. The so-called customs union goes a step deeper than a free trade area.  
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A customs union is an FTA with a common trade policy towards non-participants. An 
economic union involves a common market and in addition common economic poli-
cies. These different degrees of economic integration are not necessarily sequential 
steps and the taxonomy does not precisely fit actual arrangements.  
 
Many current FTAs seek to address two classes of trade barriers: 1) “at-the-border” 
issues (tariffs, customs duties, tariff rate quotas), and 2) “behind-the-border” issues 
(transparency, legal protection, intellectual property rights, etc.). Many of these FTAs 
build on WTO commitments and include issues that are not yet covered by the WTO 
disciplines.  
 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and Customs Unions (CU) (together defined as Re-
gional Trade Agreements (RTA)) together comprise the principal exceptions to the 
Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle of the Multilateral trade system. This 
exception is allowed under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) for trade in goods and under Article V of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) for trade in services, and in the Enabling Clause.  
 
Article XXIV provides conditions under which the WTO members may form customs 
unions and free trade areas. The three main conditions are:  
 
• Trade barriers facing non-members must not ‘on the whole’ be higher than 
those previously in effect  
• Trade barriers must be eliminated on ‘substantially all’ trade among members 
and 
• Interim arrangements to permit scheduling the customs union or free trade 
area must be completed over a reasonable period of time.  
… And what are their consequences? 
An obvious question is whether or not free trade areas improve welfare, and economic 
theory allows for affirmative and negative answers. Regional trade liberalisation leads 
to welfare enhancing trade creation as well as trade diversion, which adversely affect 
welfare (Viners well-known concepts). Which of these effects dominate is an empiri-
cal question. 
 
Traditionally, gains from trade have been most apparent in free trade agreements 
where the participating partners have very different economic structures. Comparative 
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advantages in different production activities allow partner countries to gain as a result 
of specialisation through trade creation. A refinement of this analysis (the so-called 
Heckscher-Ohlin model) illustrates how trade leads to higher prices of the cheaper 
good in each of the participating partners while lowering the prices of the scarcer 
(imported) good to more than offset this. This view of the gains from trade has been 
the core argument for entering free trade agreements for many years.    
 
More recent arguments that complement traditional trade-gain theory comprise trade 
benefits of a different form, namely gains that can be realised by countries with simi-
larly structured regions. The gains emerge from intra-industry trade, where the trading 
partners appear to be buying and selling identical goods.    
 
Several factors explain these gains, namely a) increased competitive pressures on 
suppliers that, prior to the FTA, were less challenged in their home markets, and b) 
increased specialisation of production and the increased number of stages through 
which materials are transformed prior to reaching the final consumer (increased scale 
economies). 
 
FTA’s can indeed elicit free trade, and if adopted efficiently4, can provide welfare 
gains from trade expansion to the participating countries. However, by providing mu-
tually preferential trading rules relative to non-members, FTA participants discrimi-
nate against non-participants. Non-members may experience lost export opportunities 
as products are sourced from members of the FTA, and they may lose FDI opportuni-
ties as investments are diverted to members having preferential access to the larger 
market.  
 
Preferential trade agreements can lead to the diversion of trade among their partners if 
imports from an economically inefficient regional trade agreement partner displace 
more competitive imports produced elsewhere. Such increased trade actually reduces 
the partner countries overall efficiency (trade diversion).  
                                                 
4 Many existing FTAs, however, seem to allow exceptions or restrictions on trade in sensitive prod-
ucts, i.e. the agreements do not lead to totally free trade among the members limiting the benefits 
through trade of establishing such free trade areas. An analysis of the content of seven US bilateral 
agreements illustrate that often FTA’s lead to less liberalisation in ‘politically sensitive’ sectors 
where the terms of trade has deteriorated - and may continue to - and where protectionism lobbies 
are strong, cf. Kerr and Hobbs (2006). It is concluded that the examination of US regional / bilateral 
trade agreements shows them to be a ‘mixed bag’ and that there is no strong evidence to suggest that 
they are mechanisms that will lead to trade liberalisation.  
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The net balance of the trade creation and diversion impacts, and therefore the calcula-
tion of the gains from establishing a free trade area, depend on: 
 
• Size and extent of trade barriers prior to entering the free trade agreement; 
• trade shares of each country as a trading partner in a liberalised trade situa-
tion; 
• the degree to which the effect of removal of barriers to trade between mem-
bers results in more or less access overall by trading partners into the free 
trade area; and 
• the degree to which trade diversion occurs, i.e. to what extent a reduction in 
trade barriers between the partner countries causes industries to expand that 
are relatively high cost on a global scale; 
 
In addition, dynamic gains from increased competition and realised gains from in-
creased scale economies might result from establishing an FTA. These gains arise 
from (World Bank 2002):  
 
• Investment. As tariffs are often imposed on investment goods, a reduction in 
trade barriers on these goods can lead to an increase in the return to capital 
and therefore a rise in real investment and productivity. Higher incomes from 
increased productivity lead to higher savings and thus further capital accumu-
lation. 
• Competitive effects and scale economies. An increase in foreign competition 
can reduce the market power of domestic firms leading to lower domestic 
mark-ups. In addition, the ability to increase market size through greater ex-
ports allows domestic firms to reduce their average cost through use of more 
specialised equipment and bulk-handling methods, thereby increasing pro-
ductivity. 
• Endogenous productivity. Only relatively productive foreign firms will ex-
pand into a domestic market with possible positive spill over to local firms 
through introduction of new technologies, innovations, and production meth-
ods into the domestic market thereby enhancing domestic firm productivity. 
• Endogenous capital flows. Gains from international capital mobility can be 
important and foreign direct investment may bring new and improved tech-
nologies that could flow into the domestic economy and increase market pro-
ductivity. 
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The issues of regionalism are even more complex as there is a need also to take into 
account the interaction between the different regional blocs and arrangements, as well 
as the possible strategic aspects of entering such preferential trade agreements. In ad-
dition, the analysis needs to account for the interaction between industries, commod-
ity regimes, changes in the policies and regulations dealing with services and invest-
ments within the relevant regional blocs. The actual implementation of such free trade 
areas will of course also impact the overall consequences of such trade arrangements. 
Finally, the issues of redistribution of tariff revenues for countries with an initial set 
of tariffs to the other members with lower tariffs needs to be taken into account.  
 
Regional trade agreements are clearly complex, and economic theory is useful in 
identifying their impacts. Yet because discriminatory policies, by their very nature, 
exclude conditions of a global free trade optimum, theory does not provide conclusive 
answers concerning net FTA benefits in a tariff-ridden world. Empirical studies, 
which also take into account the most important interactions within and between trad-
ing regions, are necessary to evaluate the welfare implications of any specific trade 
deal.  
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2. Effects of FTAs involving at-the-border liberalisation 
To provide a more concrete basis for discussing benefits of FTAs, relative to those of 
multilateral agreements, we present a numerical analysis of the effects of EU FTAs 
with USA, Russia and China, and compare them with a multilateral Doha round sce-
nario. In this numerical simulation, we adopt a very simple representation of an FTA 
focusing on at-the-border liberalisation. We ignore behind-the-border issues, such as 
harmonisation of regulatory barriers, establishment of rules for government procure-
ment, and liberalisation of Foreign Direct Investment. Similarly, the Doha scenario 
includes liberalisation of agricultural trade and Non-Agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA) and makes no changes in behind-the-border policies, such as domestic agri-
cultural support or trade facilitation. Also, we exclude productivity gains arising from 
realisation of scale economies and technological spill over effects. 
Model 
We carry out the trade policy simulations using the economic model and database 
created by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) (Hertel, 1997, Dimaranan et al, 
2005). The GTAP model is a standard multi-regional, static computable general equi-
librium (CGE) model with a strong neoclassical foundation. Regional production is 
generated by a constant return to scale technology in a perfectly competitive envi-
ronment, and consumer demand is represented by a non-homothetic5 demand system 
(the Constant Difference Elasticity function). The foreign trade structure is character-
ised by the Armington assumption implying imperfect substitutability between do-
mestic and foreign goods. The model uses a global primary factor price index as the 
numeraire. 
 
We take a long run perspective, which affects our assumptions regarding labour mar-
ket clearance and capital accumulation. Whereas the simulated policy changes may 
affect the sectoral employment of labour, the time horizon is long enough for the 
wage rate to adjust to leave the total number of people in employment unchanged. 
The quantities of most resource endowments, such as land, labour and natural re-
sources, are fixed, but capital accumulates with net investments. Investments are en-
dogenous and adjust to accommodate any changes in savings. This takes place at the 
global level and investments are then allocated across regions to equalise the marginal 
rate of return in all regions. Although global investments and savings must be equal, 
                                                 
5 Non-homothetic means that the composition of demand changes with the size of income. For in-
stance, households may spend a smaller share of their income on food as they grow richer. 
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this does not apply at the regional level, where the trade balance is endogenously de-
termined as the difference between regional savings and regional investments. This is 
valid as regional savings enter the regional utility function representing the value of 
future consumption.  
 
Accounting for capital accumulation, the so-called Baldwin long run comparative 
static closure (Francois et. al. 1996), is a departure from the standard GTAP closure, 
which assumes a time horizon too short for new investments to enter productive use. 
While the Baldwin closure captures important dynamic consequences of trade policy 
reform, it also introduces a new modelling challenge. GTAP does not trace factor in-
come flows across borders (such as capital returns from foreign investments, remit-
tances for labour stationed abroad, or development aid). In the standard closure, this is 
not a problem since none of these income flows are assumed to be affected by the pol-
icy shocks. However, with the Baldwin closure the model is failing to account for the 
income flows attributed to policy-induced changes in foreign investments. 
 
Unfortunately, no fully satisfactory method has yet been developed to explicitly 
model these income flows in the static GTAP model.6 One common way of “solving” 
the problem is fixing the trade balance exogenously, essentially forcing investors to 
place all savings in the home country and thereby eliminating the need to account for 
cross-border income flows (Walmsley, 1998). However, this method severely restricts 
households’ ability to adjust to trade policy shocks and may distort the results even 
more. In this paper we chose to allow foreign investments and leave the trade balance 
endogenous. The results indicate that most savings are invested at home and that for-
eign investments are relatively small. While we acknowledge that the reported wel-
fare impacts may be slightly biased, the discussions and conclusions presented in the 
paper remain valid. 
 
We have modified the standard GTAP model to accommodate agricultural trade pol-
icy analysis in the EU context. Numerous policy features of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) have been refined, including common EU financing of agricultural sup-
port, milk and sugar production quotas, etc.7 Furthermore, we have updated the data-
base with the latest changes in EU agricultural policy as detailed below.  
                                                 
6 The dynamic version of the GTAP model explicitly models cross-border income flows, but unfor-
tunately it does not yet possess the institutional detail (e.g. with respect to the Common Agricultural 
Policy) exhibited by the static GTAP model used in this paper. 
7 For more detailed discussion of the many changes to the standard GTAP model, readers are en-
couraged to read a series of working papers published by the Institute of Food and Resource Eco-
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Data 
We use an updated version of the most recent GTAP database (version 6) based on 
the year 2001. The database combines detailed bilateral trade, transport and protection 
data characterising economic linkages among regions with individual country input-
output tables, which account for intersectoral linkages within regions. The database 
contains 96 regions and 57 sectors, which are aggregated to 30 regions and 38 sectors 
to keep the model within computational limits and focused on the individual member 
countries of the EU. The GTAP database includes tariff data from Market Access 
Maps (MAcMap) contributed by the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Information 
Internationales (CEPII). The MAcMap database is compiled from UNCTAD 
TRAINS data, country notifications to the WTO, AMAD, and from national customs 
information and combines trade-weighted preferential ad valorem tariffs with the ad 
valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. 
 
Before simulating the trade policy scenarios, we construct a baseline scenario to serve 
as an updated basis for analysis. The baseline scenario updates the standard database 
with a projection of the world economy from 2001 to 2015, applying suitable shocks 
to GDP, population, labour and capital, as well as incorporating the most important 
developments, realised or planned, since 2001. We have identified and updated the 
database with the following developments: 
 
• the Agenda 2000 and the Mid-Term Review reforms of the CAP; 
• the abolishment of export quotas on textiles and apparel shipped to the EU 
and the US; 
• the accession of China to the WTO; 
• the final implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments for developing 
countries; 
• the enlargement of the EU with 10 new member countries and the extension 
of the EFTA with Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to include 
the 10 new member countries; and 
• the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement between LDCs and the EU. 
 
Box 1 summarises the baseline scenario. 
 
                                                                                                                          
nomics, Copenhagen, Denmark on reforms of the CAP and trade liberalizations under the WTO. 
These papers can be downloaded from www.foi.dk or can be obtained from the authors of this pa-
per.  
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Box 1. Assumptions shaping the baseline 2001-2015 
 
Projections 
Shocks to GDP, factor endowments and population 
Total factor productivity endogenously determined 
 
Trade Policy changes 
Abolishment of export quotas on textiles and apparel shipped to the EU and the USA 
Final implementation of the UR commitments for developing countries 
Accession of China to the WTO 
Enlargement of the EU and the extension of the EFTA  to include ten new member coun-
tries 
EBA agreement between LDCs and the EU 
 
EU Agenda 2000 and MTR Reform 
All direct payments deflated by 2 per cent per year (max budgetary outlays fixed in nominal 
terms) 
Hectare and livestock premiums (direct payments) and milk quota adjusted according to 
reform 
Decoupling of direct payments to a single farm payment 
Sugar quota unchanged 
 
USA agricultural subsidies 
Agricultural expenditure fixed in nominal terms at its 2001 level 
 
Scenarios 
In each FTA scenario, we eliminate all bilateral import tariffs and export subsi-
dies/taxes between the EU and the FTA partner. In the Doha scenario, we abolish all 
export subsidies between WTO members and apply different formulae (the tiered 
formula for agriculture and the Swiss formula for NAMA-products) to determine tar-
iff reduction schedules for each country.8 Appendix A provides details of the rules 
used to determine Doha scenario tariff reductions. In all FTA scenarios, we abstract 
from any considerations of special sensitive products demanding exemptions from 
tariff elimination in order to focus on the potential impacts of the FTAs. To provide 
for an equal basis for comparison, we also rule out any exemptions in the Doha sce-
nario. 
 
                                                 
8 The tariff reduction formulae are applied to bound tariffs at the 6 digit Harmonised System (HS6) 
level of aggregation. Applied tariffs are reduced only to the extent that initial tariffs are higher than 
the new bound level. Hence, we fully account for any binding overhang in the tariff schedules. 
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Table 1 presents the shocks applied to the model under the four scenarios. To provide 
an overview of the scenarios, the table aggregates 38 economic sectors into three, ag-
riculture and food production, manufacturing and services. Tables covering the 
shocks to all 38 sectors are provided in appendix B (tables B1 – B4). The first three 
columns show how the policy scenarios affect EU exports.9 Considering the US FTA 
as an illustration, abolishing all EU export subsidies translates into 1.9 percent reduc-
tion in trade weighted average agricultural subsidies. This is combined with an elimi-
nation of US import tariffs, corresponding to a 2.5 percent decline in trade weighted 
average agricultural tariffs. However, these shocks only affect EU exports to USA, 
which takes 17.3 percent of total EU agriculture exports. The last three columns simi-
larly present the shocks affecting EU imports; the change in US export subsidies, the 
change in EU import tariffs and the share of total import sourced from USA. 
 
Table 1 Overview over policy scenarios from an EU perspective (percent) 
 
 ---------------- EU Export -------------- ---------------- EU Import ---------------
 ∆ EU exp. ∆ Partner Sh. of exp. ∆ Partner ∆ EU Sh. of imp. 
 subsidy tariff to partner exp. subs. tariff fr. partner 
 
US FTA      
 Agriculture and food -1.9 -2.5 17.3 -0.5 -7.7 16.1 
 Manufacturing 0.0 -1.7 26.2 0.0 -1.7 18.5 
 Services 0.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 0.0 30.5 
       
Russian FTA        
 Agriculture and food -4.5 -11.5 6.3 0.0 -7.1 1.9 
 Manufacturing 0.0 -9.7 3.4 8.2 -0.9 5.6 
 Services 0.0 -0.1 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 
       
Chinese FTA        
 Agriculture and food -1.7 -6.0 7.7 0.0 -10.1 2.5 
 Manufacturing 0.0 -4.7 8.0 0.0 -3.7 20.5 
 Services 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.0 0.0 10.6 
       
Doha Scenario             
 Agriculture and food -3.2 -2.1 100.0 -0.4 -3.0 100.0 
 Manufacturing 0.0 -1.3 100.0 0.0 -0.7 100.0 
 Services 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
 
 
Table 1 gives an indication of the likely outcomes of the simulation exercise. In areas, 
where large changes in tariffs and subsidies are combined with relatively large share 
of total trade, we may expect substantial impact on EU trade. We see from the export 
and import shares that the US is generally the EU’s most important trade partner of 
the three prospective FTA countries. However, the improvements in market access 
                                                 
9 Unless otherwise noted, we always treat the EU as a single region, disregarding intra-EU trade. So, 
export and import shares in table 1 are measured relative to EU external trade only. 
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obtained by EU exporters are relatively modest (because initial tariffs are lower). For 
instance in agriculture, the US FTA abolishes an average import tariff of 2.5 percent, 
while a Russian FTA would eliminate agricultural tariffs amounting to 11.5 percent 
on average. On the other hand, US agricultural exporters to the EU face a substantial 
decline in tariffs of 7.7 percent. The US FTA is therefore expected to put pressure on 
EU agricultural producers by increasing import competition without generating large 
opportunities for export expansions. 
 
The Russian FTA produces substantial market liberalisation for EU agricultural and 
manufacturing producers, although initial trade is relatively small. Of special interest 
is the 8.2 percent increase in Russian “subsidisation” of manufacturing exports, repre-
senting elimination of export taxes. The export taxes are essentially transfers from EU 
consumers to the Russian treasury. Abolishing these taxes will serve to increase EU 
imports of manufacturers, but at the same time represent a transfer of resources from 
Russia to the EU in the shape of cheaper imports. 
 
China is the most important source of EU manufacturing imports of the three coun-
tries, surpassing even the USA. Further, elimination of EU import tariffs has a larger 
impact on Chinese trade, representing an average tariff cut of 3.7 percent, due to the 
composition of imports from China. As detailed in appendix B, a major part of im-
ports from China is in textiles and wearing apparel, which face a relatively high EU 
import tariff. We would therefore expect the Chinese FTA to produce a large increase 
in manufacturing (particularly textile) imports from China. 
 
Table 1 demonstrates one major advantage of FTAs over a multilateral Doha agree-
ment. Under FTAs, it is typically possible to obtain more substantial market access 
liberalisations than in a multilateral deal, where more participants have to come to a 
unanimous agreement. On the other hand, the table also demonstrates one major 
weakness: FTAs only affect a small proportion of trade, possibly diluting the impact 
of substantial liberalisation efforts. 
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3. Results 
Consequences for the EU economy 
Overview 
Table 2 provides a brief summary of the consequences of the three FTAs as well as 
the multilateral Doha agreement for the EU economy. Appendix B (tables B5 – B8) 
provides more detailed accounts of changes in welfare, trade and production at a sec-
toral level (tables C1 – C4 in appendix C isolate the Danish economy). All three 
FTAs yield positive, albeit in this static framework fairly modest, welfare gains to the 
EU. While the welfare gains in the US and Chinese FTAs are estimated at around 
US$ 3 - 5 bn. corresponding to a 0.04 – 0.06 percent increase in real GDP, the poten-
tial gains from a Russian FTA are much higher – about US$ 13 bn or 0.12 percent 
real GDP increase. Welfare gains from a multilateral deal is almost US$ 8 bn (0.07 
percent increase in real GDP), higher than those from the US and Chinese FTAs, but 
substantially lower than that from a Russian FTA. 
 
Table 2 Consequences for EU economy 
 
  US FTA Russian FTA Chinese FTA Doha 
 
Total Welfare (million US$) 3,490 13,433 4,581 7,672 
 Allocative efficiency 1,288 3,811 1,685 4,722 
 Capital accumulation 1,852 5,455 3,243 1,316 
 Terms of Trade 350 4,167 -346 1,633 
     
Real GDP (%) 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.07 
          
Production (%) 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.03 
 Agriculture -0.43 0.08 0.09 -1.32 
 Manufacturing 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.28 
 Services 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.06 
     
Export (%) 1.76 0.92 2.14 2.61 
 Agriculture 1.37 2.24 0.13 -0.34 
 Manufacturing 2.72 1.44 3.14 4.47 
 Services -0.20 -0.43 -0.02 0.28 
     
Import (%) 1.68 1.28 2.01 2.80 
 Agriculture 8.17 3.14 2.07 12.35 
 Manufacturing 1.92 1.53 2.83 3.37 
 Services 0.17 0.44 0.13 0.10 
          
Gross Factor Income (%) 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.09 
 Skilled labour 0.04 0.22 0.08 0.15 
 Unskilled labour 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.08 
 Capital 0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.08 
 Land -0.61 0.33 0.23 -2.88 
 Natural Resources -0.35 -2.53 0.44 1.96 
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Total welfare gains are decomposed into contributions from improvements in alloca-
tive efficiency, capital accumulation and terms of trade. Gains from allocative effi-
ciency arise from improved reallocation of productive resources (such as labour, capi-
tal and land) from less to more productive uses. For instance, when import tariffs are 
abolished, resources shift from previously protected industries towards other sectors, 
which are more in line with the country’s comparative advantage, producing an in-
crease in economic welfare.  
 
Terms of trade effects are consequences of changing export and import prices facing a 
country. So, when a country experiences an increase in its export price relative to its 
import price (e.g. due to improved market access), it may finance a larger quantity of 
imports with the same quantity of exports, thus expanding the supply of products 
available to the country’s consumers. Whereas allocative efficiency contributes to in-
creases in global welfare gains, the terms of trade affects the distribution of global 
welfare gains across countries; essentially, one country’s terms of trade gain is an-
other country’s terms of trade loss. 
 
Capital accumulation summarises the welfare consequences of changes in the stock 
of capital due to changes in net investment. In the discussion of the simulation results, 
we will distinguish between the initial static welfare effect, comprising allocative ef-
ficiency and terms of trade, and the capital accumulation effect. As discussed above, a 
policy shock affects an economy’s allocative efficiency and terms of trade, generating 
an increase or a reduction in income and welfare. This initial static welfare effect of-
ten shows the direction of the capital accumulation effect. If a trade agreement has a 
positive effect on income, through improvements in efficiency and/or terms of trade, a 
part of that extra income will be saved by households, making possible an expansion 
in the capital stock. At the same time, rising income will increase demand for pro-
duced goods, pushing up factor returns and thus attracting more investments. Gener-
ally, economies that are gaining the most from the trade agreement will be prepared to 
pay the largest rate of return on capital, and will get most of the new investments.10 
Therefore, we will tend to see that the welfare gains from capital accumulation rein-
force the benefits deriving from allocative efficiency and terms of trade. 
                                                 
10 The income expansion caused by the increase in the capital stock will by itself contribute to fur-
ther capital accumulation and income growth. However, due to diminishing returns to scale (given 
the stock of other primary factors), the increase in production and income will become smaller and 
smaller and the economy will eventually reach a steady state as gross investment equals capital de-
preciation. 
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From an overall EU perspective, a Russian FTA seems a lot more attractive than a US 
or Chinese FTA and it yields more economic welfare than a multilateral agreement. 
However, a large proportion of the benefits is derived from terms of trade effects, im-
plying massive transfers to the EU from the rest of the world (we discuss the world-
wide impacts of the FTAs below). In contrast, the US and Chinese FTAs as well as 
the Doha round scenario are more dependent upon allocative efficiency effects, bene-
fiting the EU without corresponding losses to the rest of the world. 
 
In the three FTA scenarios, the welfare gains from capital accumulation dwarfs the 
initial static gains from allocative efficiency. The Russian FTA provides a large boost 
to welfare through capital accumulation, but relative to the initial static welfare ef-
fects the Chinese FTA actually seems to be more effective in generating investments. 
Whereas the capital accumulation effect in the Russian FTA is smaller (around US$ 
5.5 bn.) than the combined allocative efficiency and terms of trade effects (about US$ 
8 bn.), the Chinese FTA provides a welfare gain from capital accumulation (US$ 3.2 
bn), which is more than double the initial static expansion (US$ 1.3 bn.). The reason 
can be found in a large Chinese savings rate (in the GTAP database, China saves 37% 
of her income – the highest rate of any region in the simulation). With the Chinese 
FTA generating gains for China, a relatively large proportion of global income is 
saved, boosting investments and producing an expansion in the global stock of capi-
tal. In contrast, the US and Russian FTAs benefit economies, which exhibit relatively 
low savings rates, and the agreements do not generate any new capital but merely af-
fect a redistribution of capital to the FTA partners from the rest of the world. 
 
Compared with the FTAs, the capital accumulation gains accruing to the EU from a 
Doha round agreement are relatively modest. This pattern reflects the geographically 
limited scope of bilateral compared to multilateral agreements. In bilateral agree-
ments, only the few participating countries experience the growth in income, demand 
and returns to capital, leading to inflow of new investments. In contrast, with a multi-
lateral agreement a larger number of countries are positively affected and the EU 
faces greater competition for capital investment. Although the EU generally gains 
from a multilateral agreement, other regions, particularly in South East Asia, are ex-
pected to benefit even more, providing a more attractive destination for investments.  
 
Apart from large differences in the potential size of the welfare gains, the three FTAs 
impact the EU economy in different ways. In the following, we briefly draw main 
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conclusions from each of the FTAs. As the Doha round has been extensively analysed 
in the literature, we will not go into a detailed analysis of this scenario. 
 
The EU-US FTA 
The EU-US FTA results in a shift of resources from agricultural and food production 
towards manufacturing. As EU tariffs on imports from the US are eliminated, Ameri-
can access to European food markets is greatly improved for a wide range of prod-
ucts. US food producers manage to greatly expand exports into the EU, particularly 
meat products (bovine and other meats) and the residual commodity, Other Food 
Products (table B5 in the appendix show the change in export and import from/to all 
sources/destinations). The opposite, however, is not true. Although US tariffs on EU 
agricultural exports are also abolished, they are relatively small in comparison and are 
outweighed for many commodities by the simultaneous elimination of sizeable EU 
export subsidies. In effect, EU imports of agricultural products increase by around 8.2 
percent while agricultural exports expand by only 1.4 percent. The sharper competi-
tion on EU agricultural markets leads to contraction of total agricultural production of 
0.4 percent. In value terms the largest declines are seen in the meat products and other 
food products sectors. However in relative terms, rice production takes the largest hit, 
showing a 9.2 percent decline in processed rice production and a massive 27.4 percent 
drop in paddy rice output. 
 
In manufacturing, the outlook is better. Manufacturing production increases by 0.2 
percent to meet an expansion in manufacturing exports of 2.7 percent. The growth in 
manufacturing imports is lower at 1.9 percent. The FTA eliminates relatively high US 
tariffs on the three clothing sectors, textiles, wearing apparel and leather products. 
Most EU members have fairly insignificant clothing exports to the US. However, It-
aly, accounting for almost 50 percent of all EUs exports of clothing to the US, gains 
tremendously from the increased market access. Due to the US tariff eliminations, ex-
porting clothes has become a relatively cheaper way for Italy to finance her imports 
compared to other exporting sectors. As the Italian clothing industry expands produc-
tion to meet the increasing export demand, it draws resources (in terms of capital and 
labour) away from other sectors. This causes a decline in the supply pushing up prices 
(export as well as domestic). As a result, the overall level of export prices increase, 
while import prices are more or less unchanged, yielding a considerable terms of trade 
effect for the Italian economy (see also table 3 below). Italy accounts for almost half 
of EUs total welfare gains. Similar stories may be told on German exports of motor 
vehicles and parts, and Irish export on chemicals, rubber and plastics. 
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The EU-Russian FTA 
The major gain for the EU of the Russian FTA comes from cheaper access to natural 
resources and processed petroleum and coal products (see table B6 in appendix B). 
Natural resources is an aggregate commodity consisting of non-processed raw materi-
als such as oil, gas, coal, minerals and forestry. Almost half (47 percent) of EUs im-
ports from Russia consists of natural resources and another 16 percent is in petroleum 
and coal products. Under the FTA, Russia abolishes export taxes of 9.4 percent on 
natural resources and 9.5 percent on petroleum and coal products considerably lower-
ing the import prices paid by the EU. Total EU imports of petroleum and coal prod-
ucts increase by almost 10 percent, lowering EU domestic prices to the benefit of the 
European consumers. While the growth in total EU imports of natural resources from 
all sources is relatively modest (US$ 967 million corresponding to 2.9 percent), there 
is a major shift in the sourcing of this import. Imports of natural resources from Rus-
sia increase by a massive US$ 9.8 bn. (about 48 percent), while imports from other 
sources decline by just over US$ 8.8 bn. (9 percent). Substituting a sizeable part of 
natural resources imports with cheaper sources generates large terms of trade gains to 
the EU. 
 
Although liberalisation of trade in natural resources and petroleum and coal products 
provide the bulk of EU welfare gains, the FTA provide benefits in a broad range of 
manufacturing sectors. As Russia has not yet joined the WTO, her manufacturing 
trade is still highly regulated compared to other industrial countries, with import tar-
iffs ranging from 5 percent to 19 percent (in wearing apparel) and export taxes around 
5 percent in many sectors (see table B2 in appendix B). Eliminating these distortions 
improve market access for EU firms allowing them to expand exports and raise export 
prices, and reduce import prices for the benefit of EU consumers. The result is large 
terms of trade benefits for the EU, however, with corresponding Russian terms of 
trade losses. 
 
In agriculture, we see the largest changes in the trade of processed meat products. The 
European bovine meat producers are protected by high import tariffs (almost 84 per-
cent) and supported by generous export subsidies (around 46 percent). The FTA 
eliminates both of these in the trade with Russia, reducing total exports of bovine 
meats by 17 percent (US$ 186 million) and increasing imports by 48 percent (US$ 
781 million). For other meat products (includes pork and poultry), the Russian FTA 
opens up for increased export opportunities as relatively large Russian tariffs (of al-
most 19 percent) are abolished, eliciting a 16 percent (US$ 910 million) expansion in 
total exports. Although high EU tariffs (19 percent) are also eliminated, Russia is not 
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a strong exporter of other meats, and the 7.6 percent (US$ 74 million) increase in total 
imports is relatively modest. As a result of these shifts in trade, EU production of bo-
vine meat declines by almost US$ 1.2 bn. (almost 2%), while production of other 
meat products expands by around US$ 1 bn. (1%). 
 
The EU-Chinese FTA 
The major part of EUs welfare gain from the Chinese FTA is derived from freeing up 
trade in broad range of manufacturing sectors (see table B7 in appendix B), particu-
larly the ‘heavy’ industries, including chemicals, motor vehicles and other machinery 
and equipment. Elimination of high Chinese import tariffs in these industries yield 
improved market access for EU firms, allowing them to expand export and produc-
tion. Liberalisation of trade in electronic equipment is also a notable source of welfare 
increase, not because tariffs are particularly high, but due to a significant bilateral 
trade in such products. In value terms, the increase in electronic imports is twice as 
large as the expansion of exports, and the sector experiences a minor drop in produc-
tion. Consumers, however, benefit from greater access cheaper electronics.  
 
The major loser of the Chinese FTA is the European wearing apparel industry. This 
sector is highly protected by import tariffs, not only in the EU but also on the Chinese 
side. Eliminating the tariffs results in considerable expansion in EU imports (12.5 
percent in textiles and 15.5 percent in wearing apparel), but also an increase in EU 
exports (around 10 percent in both sectors). The cheap Chinese textiles and wearing 
apparel displace a part of the EU production from the European markets, forcing EU 
producers to find alternative export markets putting a downward pressure on export 
prices. The clothing industries are partially helped by lower costs of imported inter-
mediate inputs and improved access to Chinese markets. However, the losses to the 
industry from fiercer import competition by far outweigh the gains from opened ex-
port opportunities and EU production of textiles and wearing apparel declines by 5.1 
and 7.3 percent respectively. Although liberalisation of trade in clothing enhances ef-
ficiency and provide cheaper products for European consumers, the decline in profit-
ability in the EU clothing industries reduces capital investment (i.e. negative capital 
accumulation) and, hence, income generating capacity in the sector. 
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Consequences for individual EU members 
Table 3 distributes combined EU welfare effects on individual member coun-
tries/regions.11 It decomposes total welfare effects into allocative efficiency, capital 
accumulation, terms of trade and effects of intra-EU transfers due to the Common Ag-
ricultural Policy.  
 
It is not surprising that most EU members derive the largest welfare gains from the 
Russian FTA, which yields the largest combined economic benefit. However, there 
are exceptions, notably Ireland, UK, Sweden, and Denmark, which are less dependent 
on Russian supplies of natural resources and consequently reap smaller terms of trade 
benefits from lower import prices.  
 
The US FTA improves the allocative efficiency of all EU members as previously pro-
tected industries face sharpened competition from US imports. However, the terms of 
trade effects exhibit greater variety across members, with Italy, Germany and Ireland 
being the main winners and Belgium/Luxemburg and the Netherlands the main losers. 
This variety is a result of differences in the composition of exports to USA. Facing 
increasing imports as the EU liberalise their markets, EU producers need to lower 
their domestic prices in order to stay competitive, or channel their excess supply to-
wards other markets. The terms of trade winners find it relatively easy to expand ex-
ports to USA. As mentioned above, Italy benefits from a focus on exports of textiles, 
wearing apparel and leather goods, which enjoy relatively large improvements in 
market access. The same is the case for Germany in motor vehicles and parts and for 
Ireland in chemicals, rubber and plastic. In contrast, the terms of trade losers focus on 
relatively less protected US markets and therefore do not experience large improve-
ments in export market access. Therefore, they have to lower their export prices in or-
der to raise exports. 
 
The same mechanisms drive the results in the Chinese FTA. Overall, the EU experi-
ences negative terms of trade effects, as the improved access to EU markets, particu-
larly in textiles, wearing apparel and electronics, achieved by Chinese firms are more 
valuable than that enjoyed by EU producers to Chinese markets. However, there are a 
few exceptions, notably Germany and Sweden in the paper industry, motor vehicles 
and parts and other machinery. A few members actually lose from the Chinese FTA, 
including some of the Mediterranean and East European members. 
                                                 
11 Due to computational limitations, Belgium and Luxemburg as well as Cyprus and Malta, have 
been aggregated into two regions. 
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Table 3 Welfare effects for EU members (million US$) 
   
 USA FTA Russian FTA Chinese FTA 
  Total Effic. Capital Tot Transf. Total Effic. Capital Tot Transf. Total Effic. Capital Tot Transf. 
   
Belgium/Luxemburg -31 54 87 -170 -2 449 89 159 209 -7 123 44 172 -88 -5 
Denmark -41 7 -22 -25 -2 60 27 13 21 -2 130 49 62 25 -4 
Germany 828 292 372 140 23 3,191 903 1,190 1,088 10 1,989 489 964 533 4 
Greece 15 40 -13 -14 1 176 57 51 67 2 -59 18 -18 -60 0 
Spain -34 52 -81 -8 3 539 111 200 228 0 60 87 125 -155 3 
France -5 80 -44 -36 -4 1,013 569 147 277 21 668 150 534 -4 -12 
Ireland 515 72 323 127 -7 -44 13 -41 -10 -6 56 21 47 -8 -4 
Italy 1,664 302 847 539 -24 2,694 615 1,308 769 1 382 151 400 -175 5 
Netherlands -84 45 41 -188 18 1,490 484 724 287 -5 263 184 199 -127 8 
Austria 95 47 63 -16 1 293 90 100 101 2 209 97 129 -19 2 
Portugal 87 27 18 41 1 77 31 12 31 3 -220 -32 -64 -127 2 
Finland 19 13 6 8 -9 584 146 236 207 -5 285 72 144 72 -3 
Sweden 127 53 46 37 -9 120 77 18 22 4 329 73 123 133 -1 
UK 290 88 218 -45 28 -18 90 -139 -7 38 351 182 329 -175 15 
Cyprus/Malta 10 12 3 -2 -3 21 31 10 -21 2 12 7 8 -2 -2 
Czech Republic -2 11 4 -11 -6 353 45 219 94 -4 2 15 17 -26 -4 
Hungary 33 17 25 -7 -2 479 97 253 134 -5 45 25 44 -23 -1 
Poland -9 50 -28 -32 1 1,099 216 543 372 -33 60 50 69 -57 -2 
Slovakia 15 2 2 13 -1 335 53 188 93 0 -14 4 0 -18 -1 
Slovenia -8 2 -7 -1 -2 42 3 15 26 -2 4 3 9 -8 -1 
Estonia 1 3 0 1 -2 80 11 41 32 -4 -12 1 -4 -8 -1 
Latvia 3 16 -7 -7 1 127 2 74 53 -2 -19 1 -10 -9 0 
Lithuania 0 2 -2 2 -2 273 50 136 95 -8 -64 -6 -37 -22 0 
Total 3,490 1,288 1,852 350 0 13,433 3,811 5,455 4,167 0 4,581 1,685 3,243 -346 0 
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As mentioned above, the capital accumulation effects generally reinforce the initial 
static welfare gains from improved allocative efficiency and terms of trade. The re-
gions, which benefit the most from these initial static gains (such as Italy and Ger-
many in the US and Russian FTAs), are also the ones, which enjoy the highest rates 
of investment and vice versa. However, there are exceptions. Consider the UK as an 
illustration. She enjoys small, but positive initial static welfare gains in all three 
FTAs, the largest in the Russian FTA. However, while accumulating capital in the US 
and Chinese FTAs, the UK actually experiences net depreciation of capital in the 
Russian FTA.  
 
There are two explanations: First, although the UK economy expands in all three sce-
narios, she still has to compete with other EU member for the available capital. Under 
the Russian FTA, other regions (notably Germany and Italy) grow more than the UK, 
and they are consequently able to pay a higher rate of return on capital attracting a 
larger part of available savings for investment. The second explanation involves rela-
tive price impacts of the trade agreements. Investors are assumed to place their sav-
ings where they earn the highest real return on capital. If prices on capital goods used 
in investments increase, the real return on capital declines and investors are encour-
aged to find more profitable investment opportunities abroad. In the case of the UK, 
the Russian FTA tends to increase the prices of commodities most extensively used 
for investment purposes (primarily services, but also machinery and motor vehicles) 
reducing the real return to capital and causing investment outflow. In the US and Chi-
nese FTAs, the situation is reversed. 
Worldwide impact of the FTAs 
Table 4 presents the worldwide welfare impacts generated by the FTAs, and com-
pares the three scenarios with the multilateral Doha agreement. There is no doubt that 
from a global perspective a multilateral agreement generates much more welfare than 
any individual FTA. While an FTA may facilitate greater liberalisation for the par-
ticipants compared to a multilateral deal, most countries in the world are left out of 
the agreement and actually end up losing.  
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Table 4 Regional welfare effects (Million US$) 
 
 US FTA Russian FTA Chinese FTA Doha 
     
EU 3,490 13,433 4,581 7,672 
 Allocative efficiency 1,288 3,811 1,685 4,722 
 Capital accumulation 1,852 5,455 3,243 1,316 
 Terms of Trade 350 4,167 -346 1,633 
     
USA 4,694 -3,421 -44 -5,503 
 Allocative efficiency 16 1 -137 985 
 Capital accumulation 2,328 -3,259 593 -5,581 
 Terms of Trade 2,349 -164 -500 -907 
     
Russia -220 -758 -46 -622 
 Allocative efficiency -36 316 -20 -266 
 Capital accumulation -76 568 -7 -485 
 Terms of Trade -108 -1,642 -19 129 
     
China -1,288 -979 8,808 6,467 
 Allocative efficiency -149 -112 996 952 
 Capital accumulation -691 -613 5,114 1,139 
 Terms of Trade -448 -254 2,697 4,377 
     
EFTA -342 -630 -46 1,163 
 Allocative efficiency -32 -33 -10 1,000 
 Capital accumulation -180 -169 -23 -73 
 Terms of Trade -130 -428 -13 237 
     
Rest of Asia -3,413 -2,867 -2,372 64,471 
 Allocative efficiency -831 -356 -493 43,263 
 Capital accumulation -1,995 -1,762 -687 26,370 
 Terms of Trade -586 -749 -1,192 -5,163 
     
Sub-Saharan Africa -236 -163 -151 2,362 
 Allocative efficiency -28 -9 -36 714 
 Capital accumulation -104 -17 -43 1,035 
 Terms of Trade -103 -137 -72 612 
     
Rest of the World -5,385 -2,741 -1,588 11,017 
 Allocative efficiency -714 -382 -358 4,410 
 Capital accumulation -3,345 -1,560 -667 7,557 
 Terms of Trade -1,326 -799 -563 -950 
     
Total -2,700 1,874 9,142 87,027 
 Allocative efficiency -486 3,236 1,627 55,780 
 Capital accumulation -2,211 -1,356 7,522 31,279 
 Terms of Trade -3 -6 -7 -32 
 
 
While the EU gains moderately from the Chinese and US FTAs, the agreements are 
more beneficial to the FTA partners due to favourable terms of trade effects. The op-
posite is the case under the Russian FTA. Recall that the FTA abolishes large Russian 
taxes on exports to the EU, particularly on natural resources and petroleum and coal 
products, in effect transferring resources from the Russian treasury to EU consumers. 
This results in large terms of trade losses to Russia, which more than outweighs the 
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modest allocative efficiency gains. However, Russia is not the only country that has 
to pay for cheap EU imports. Lower import prices spur an increase in EU demand for 
Russian natural resources, raising her export prices to all destinations. As only the EU 
are exempted from Russian export taxes, the rest of Russia’s main trading partners 
(mainly South Asia and China) face the full increase in import prices, generating 
negative terms of trade effects to those regions. Similarly, large suppliers of natural 
resources to the EU (primarily Sub-Saharan Africa and Rest of the World) face de-
clining demand and export prices, and they too experience negative terms of trade 
losses. 
 
Generally, every FTA produces welfare losses to all non-participating regions, in 
terms of allocative efficiency as well as terms of trade. Negative allocative efficiency 
effects occur because the shifts in participating countries’ trade patterns indirectly af-
fect the trade of the rest of the world as well. As an example, consider the effect of the 
US FTA on the Rest of Asia (i.e. Asia except China). A large proportion of the effi-
ciency losses is attributed to the paddy rice sector. Paddy rice is a highly protected 
sector in the EU and liberalisation under the US FTA generate a considerable increase 
in EU imports of paddy rice from USA. When US rice producers realise that they gain 
better prices on the EU market they shift some of their exports away from Asia to-
wards the EU. Thus, indirectly EU liberalisation towards the US reduces imports into 
the Asian paddy rice market, which is already protected by trade barriers. The decline 
in import competition encourages expansion of the protected paddy rice sector, 
thereby reducing the efficiency of resource allocation. 
 
Many such stories exist. Countries that are not part of the FTA typically lose from the 
agreement, as they themselves are not liberalising their own economies, and as their 
access to export markets are worsened relative to FTA participants. In most cases, the 
short term losses are exacerbated by long term welfare reductions caused by net capi-
tal depreciation. 
 
A welfare analysis of a Doha round agreement is not the focus of this paper, but the 
significant welfare losses to the US captures the attention and deserves a comment. 
The welfare losses are attributed to negative capital accumulation effects as net de-
preciation reduces the US stock of capital. Although, the US economy exhibits a very 
slight initial static expansion (the combined effect of allocative efficiency and terms 
of trade), this gain is insignificant relative to the growth in other regions of the world. 
Investors find particularly the Asian markets to be more lucrative destinations for in-
vestment, in effect causing an outflow of capital from the US. Once again, these re-
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sults demonstrate that when accounting for capital accumulation effects, whether a 
country experiences initial static gains or losses relatively to other countries has im-
portant implications for overall welfare impacts of the policy shock.12 
Sensitivity analysis 
Like any other economic modelling exercise, the analyses in this paper are based on a 
number of assumptions representing the beliefs the analyst has regarding the work-
ings of the economic system. It is important to recognise that results may change, if 
some of the assumptions turn out not to be valid. A full sensitivity analysis is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but in the following we will briefly discuss the implications 
for the results of varying one of the most important parameters in trade analysis, the 
so-called Armington elasticity. 
 
The GTAP model (like most other applied trade models) is based on the assumption 
that commodities are differentiated by region of origin, in the sense that e.g. Russian 
wheat is assumed to be different from American wheat and they may command dif-
ferent prices in a given market. The Armington elasticity represents the degree of sub-
stitutability of commodities from different sources. If this parameter is large, com-
modities from different regions are considered close substitutes. The significance of 
the Armington elasticity in trade policy analysis relates to how trade flows adjust to 
policy shocks. As an example, suppose a trade policy reform reduced the price of 
Russian wheat relative to American wheat on the EU market. With a high Armington 
elasticity, the two commodities would be regarded as close substitutes, and we would 
expect a relatively large shift in demand from American wheat towards Russian 
wheat. To the extent that the EU carries any weight in the global market for wheat, 
this shift in demand would push up Russian prices and depress American prices. Gen-
erally, with high Armington elasticities we will expect to see large changes in trade 
flows and relatively small price changes, and vice versa. 
 
It is important to recognise that the Armington specification is not a theoretically 
founded representation of commodity characteristics, but a modelling technique de-
signed to capture empirically observed trade behaviour in applied models. In addition 
to commodity heterogeneity, Armington elasticities may represent inertia in consump-
tion habits, resistance to changing contractual and institutional arrangements and 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that the welfare implications are still insignificant relative to the US economy. 
For instance, the US$ 5.6 billion loss from capital depreciation represents a mere 0.13 percent de-
cline in the US capital stock.  
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other types of trade friction. This also implies a time dimension. In the short term, 
importers and exporters tend to stick to their traditional trade partners, while in the 
longer term, if price changes persist, trade relations are expected to change as well. In 
fact, the empirical literature supports higher long-run than short-run Armington elas-
ticities (McDaniel and Balistreri, 2002). 
 
The analyses in this paper are based on standard GTAP parameters.13 Particularly the 
Russian FTA scenario could be sensitive to variations in the Armington elasticities, as 
price changes in just a few commodities contribute a major part of welfare changes. 
Consequently, we carry out an alternative simulation of the Russian FTA, in which 
we double the Armington elasticities on the two key commodities, natural resources, 
and petroleum and coal products, implying that these commodities become more ho-
mogenous and that one source of imports is much easier substituted for another.14 
Figure 2 compares the welfare implications of the EU – Russian FTA in the core and 
alternative scenarios. 
 
                                                 
13 The standard GTAP model and assumptions are documented in Dimaranan  (2005). 
14 Even in the core scenario, the Armington elasticity for natural resources is higher than any other 
commodity, implying that natural resources are considered the more homogeneous commodity. 
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Figure 2. Regional welfare implications of EU – Russian FTA in the core and alter-
native scenarios 
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In terms of overall welfare effects, the doubling of Armington elasticities for natural 
resources and petroleum and coal products changes very little.15 The EU gains 
slightly more, the Rest of Asia loses slightly less, but the biggest change is for Russia, 
which face a much larger decline in welfare. Recall that the elimination of Russian 
export taxes on natural resources under the FTA gives the EU access to cheaper im-
port from Russia. With the doubling of the Armington elasticities, Russian natural re-
sources are considered closer substitutes to natural resources from other sources, and 
there is an even greater shift in EU demand towards Russia. Since the EU now re-
places a larger part of its natural resources consumption with cheap Russian imports, 
welfare increases more. Similarly, Russia supplies a larger quantity of natural re-
sources “tax free” to the EU.  
 
It may seem surprising that the EU stand to gain so much from gaining greater access 
to cheaper Russian natural resources, particularly in a globalised world, where trade 
                                                 
15 Although not shown explicitly in figure 1, this also applies to the decomposition of the welfare 
effects into allocative efficiency, capital accumulation and terms of trade. The relative sizes of the 
three components are more or less unchanged. 
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in such basic commodities as oil and gas is supposedly conducted on the basis of a 
single world market price. However, the Armington specification asserts that a single 
world market price does not exist. Even basic commodities are not completely homo-
geneous (for instance, crude oil is differentiated by sulphuric content), and since 
transport costs weigh heavy in bulk commodity trade, import prices depend on the 
distance to the supplier. Furthermore, in this analysis natural resources encompass a 
range of unprocessed raw materials, including oil, gas, coal, minerals and timber, so 
as an aggregate commodity natural resources is not a homogeneous good. Conse-
quently, we cannot expect import prices to be completely unaffected by trade shocks. 
 
The present trade policy analysis simulates an elimination of a 9.4 percent Russian 
export tax. The shift in EU import sourcing raises demand for Russian natural re-
sources and put an upward pressure on the price. Therefore, the trade shock does not 
imply a 9.4 percent drop in EUs import price. The source-specific price on EU im-
ports of Russian natural resources decline by 5.5 percent (or by 4.8 percent in the al-
ternative scenario with double armington elasticities). The average EU price on im-
ports of natural resources from all sources decline by just 1.6 percent (in both scenar-
ios). Even this small reduction in import prices produce significant terms of trade 
gains to the EU because it affects very large trade flows. 
 
We conclude that the results for the Russian FTA provided in this paper are fairly ro-
bust to changes in one of the important assumptions, the Armington elasticity for 
natural resources and petroleum and coal products. Although we find large changes in 
the composition of trade flows into the EU, there is little change at the aggregate level 
and the conclusions and discussions presented in the paper remain valid. 
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4. Conclusion and discussion 
Conclusions 
We conclude that from an overall EU perspective the potential implementation of 
three bilateral FTAs with Russia, China, and the USA are indeed viable alternatives to 
the currently stalled multilateral Doha round. They all provide welfare gains to the 
EU, particularly the Russian FTA. However, benefits accruing to FTA participants are 
largely achieved at the expense of the rest of the world, and global welfare gains are 
insignificant compared to a multilateral deal. Clearly, from a global perspective, 
FTAs at best constitute a less desirable ”plan-B” or ”second best” option. 
 
The numerical analysis shows that a Russian FTA is by far the most interesting of the 
three, seen from an overall economic and EU perspective, acknowledging that politi-
cal considerations and concerns very often plays an important role in designing for-
eign Policy and trade policies.  Elimination of Russian export taxes on natural re-
sources (including oil and gas) and refined petroleum and coal products generates a 
substantial welfare benefit to the EU through cheaper import prices. An FTA with the 
US is likely to produce a shift in resources from agriculture to manufacturing, as rela-
tively large EU agricultural tariffs are eliminated. The main beneficiaries are Italian 
textile producers and to a lesser extent the German motor vehicle industry and the 
Irish chemical industry, which all face improved access to US markets. Finally, a 
Chinese FTA is expected to generate a large inflow of cheap Chinese textiles to the 
benefit of EU consumers, but at the expense of the EU textile industry. 
 
The simulations also show that a major part of the EU welfare gains are the long term 
gains arising from increasing investment and capital accumulation. A portion of the 
short term income gained from improvements in efficiency and/or terms of trade is 
saved and invested in productive capital. A multilateral Doha agreement generates 
more global savings for investment than any of the bilateral deals. However, the EU 
only manages to capture a modest proportion of new capital, as other regions, notably 
South Asia, experience higher growth and are consequently more attractive destina-
tion for investment. In contrast, under the bilateral agreements, the EU is able to ac-
cumulate more new capital. This is, however, at the expense of non-participating re-
gions, which face net depreciation of capital. 
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Discussion 
The strongest argument for the three bilateral agreements’ implementation is that such 
bilateral options are the only politically feasible roads to trade liberalisation given the 
stalled Doha round, and superior for EU economies than no agreement at all. There is, 
however, reason to believe that full bilateral liberalisation could face some of the 
same difficulties plaguing multilateral negotiations.  
 
The US FTA exhibits some of the same distributional patterns as the multilateral deal, 
albeit to a lesser extent, with EU consumers and manufacturing producers gaining at 
the expense of agricultural producers. In fact, when the idea of a transatlantic free 
trade zone was last aired in 1998, negotiations foundered on disagreements over agri-
cultural tariffs (Financial Times, 2006). The Chinese FTA generates a large variation 
in gains across EU countries, and members are likely to have different views on 
whether to pursue such an agreement or maybe turn the political efforts in another di-
rection. The risk is that in the negotiation process, internally in the EU as well exter-
nally with trade partners, pressure for exemptions and special flexibilities will emerge 
as they do in multilateral negotiations. This will only serve to diminish (or even re-
verse?) the impacts of trade liberalisation and make trade relationships even more 
complex. 
 
As well, a set of bilateral agreements can facilitate the strategy, by a group of nations, 
to promote increased and liberalised economic and political integration via disman-
tling trade barriers on commodity/services trade, capital/labour movements, and in-
vestment flows.  Nonetheless, while facilitators of such bilateral agreements often jus-
tify such agreements as providing a “mid-way bridge” to the ultimately desired goal 
of a multilateral agreement, the bilateral agreements have been criticized and/or ques-
tioned if they will ultimately foster the multilateral goals. As formulated by Bhagwati 
and Panagariya (1996):  
 
“The claims in favour of PTAs are weak at best and specious and 
founded on unscientific assertions at worst, the principle reason to 
condemn the PTAs remains the classic argument for multilateral-
ism: that it builds trade liberalisation on the foundation on non-
discrimination”. 
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In any case, the interest and the number of bilateral FTAs are rapidly expanding, and 
such interest and actions have been clearly “fuelled” by the lack of success in the 
multilateral Doha Round.  
A note on the Russian FTA 
The analysis of the Russian FTA, producing large welfare benefits to the EU and sig-
nificant welfare losses to Russia, may overestimate the impact. In the baseline sce-
nario, Russia is not yet a member of WTO, although this is likely to happen with or 
without an EU-Russian FTA. We were unable to formulate Russian WTO member-
ship as a part of the baseline scenario, as the conditions upon which Russia are likely 
to enter are not yet publicly available. However, Russian WTO membership is judged 
to substantially affect our results. For instance, the conditions are likely to involve the 
elimination of Russian export taxes, which are major drivers of results in the present 
analysis. A more detailed analysis of a possible Russian FTA should therefore seek to 
incorporate Russia’s WTO accession into the baseline. This is, however, beyond the 
scope of the present paper. 
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Appendix A: Doha round scenario 
This appendix provides a brief overview over the rules applied to determine tariff re-
duction schedules in the Doha round scenario. Countries are divided into classifica-
tions, each with different reduction commitments. The country classification is given 
in table A1. Different rules are applied to agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market 
Access (NAMA). 
Agriculture 
The agriculture section of the scenario distinguishes between three groups of coun-
tries: 
 
• Least developed countries: No reduction commitments 
 
• Developing countries (also including paragraph 6 countries, small vulner-
able economies, newly acceded member countries in table A1): Reductions in 
tariffs according to tiered formula: 
 
Pre-Doha tariff Reduction 
0 – 30% 25% 
30 – 80% 30% 
80 – 130% 35% 
130% + 40% 
 
Post-Doha tariffs are capped at 150%. 
 
• Developed countries: Reduction in tariffs according to tiered formula: 
 
Pre-Doha tariff Reduction 
0 – 30% 35% 
30 – 60% 45% 
60 – 90% 50% 
90% + 60% 
 
Post-Doha tariffs are capped at 100% and least developed countries are given duty-
free access 
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NAMA 
The NAMA section of the scenario uses the country classification given in table A1: 
 
• Least developed countries: No reduction commitments 
 
• Paragraph 6 countries: Expected to bind 95% of tariff lines at an average 
level not exceeding 28.5 percent. Calculations have shown that this may be 
done without cutting any applied tariffs. Therefore, no reductions are made in 
the scenario. 
 
• Small vulnerable economies: Expected to bind 95% of tariff lines at an av-
erage level not exceeding 22 percent. Calculations have shown that this may 
be done without cutting any applied tariffs. Therefore, no reductions are 
made in the scenario. 
 
• Newly acceded member countries: Same reduction commitments as devel-
oping countries, except for Armenia, Moldova and Kyrgyz Republic, which 
make same commitments as paragraph 6 countries. 
 
• Developing countries: Reducing tariffs using the simple Swiss formula, with 
a coefficient of 15. The formula is given as: 
 
0
1
0
15
15
tt
t
×= +  
 
where t0 is the pre-Doha tariff and t1 is the post-Doha tariff. This formula ef-
fectively imposes a maximum tariff of 15 percent. 
 
• Developed countries: Reducing tariffs using the simple Swiss formula, with 
a coefficient of 10. The formula is given as: 
 
0
1
0
10
10
tt
t
×= +  
 
This formula effectively imposes a maximum tariff of 10 percent. Least de-
veloped countries are granted duty-free access to developed country markets. 
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Table A1 Countries classification in the Doha round scenario 
 
LDC 
Paragraph 6 countries 
Countries with less than 35 per-
cent binding coverage 
Small, Vulnerable  
Economies 
Newly acceded 
Members from year 2000 
Demanding exceptions 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
      
Angola Cameroon  Antigua and Barbuda Albania Argentina Australia 
Bangladesh Congo Barbados Armenia Bahrain Canada 
Benin Cote d’Ivoire Belize Croatia Brazil Island 
Burkina Faso Cuba Bolivia F. Yugoslav R. of Macedonia Bulgaria Japan 
Burundi Ghana Botswana Georgia Chile Liechtenstein 
Cambodia Kenya Brunei Darusalam Jordan Colombia New Zealand 
Central African Rep Macao Costa Rica Moldova Korea Norway 
Chad Mauritius Congo Republic  Oman Hong Kong Switzerland 
Congo Nigeria Dominica Taiwan India USA 
Dem. Rep. Congo Sri Lanka The Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Indonesia EU25 
Djibouti Suriname Ecuador China Israel  
Gambia Zimbabwe El Salvador  Kuwait  
Guinea (Conakry)  Fiji  Malaysia  
Guinea Bissau  Gabon  Mexico  
Haiti  Grenada  Morocco  
Lesotho  Guatemala  Pakistan  
Madagascar  Guyana  Peru  
Malawi  Honduras  Philippines  
Maldives  Jamaica  Qatar  
Mali  Mongolia  Rumania  
Mauritania  Namibia  Singapore  
Mozambique  Nicaragua  South Africa       
Myanmar  Panama  Egypt  
Nepal  Papua New Guinea  Thailand  
Niger  Paraguay  Tunisia  
Rwanda  Saint Kitts and Nevis   Turkey  
Senegal  Saint Lucia  United Arab Emirates  
Sierra Leone  Saint Vincent Grenadines  Venezuela   
Solomon Isles  Swaziland    
Tanzania  Trinidad and Tobago    
Togo  Uruguay     
Uganda      
Zambia      
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Appendix B: Detailed tables at sectoral level 
 
Table B1  Initial subsidies and tariffs in EU-US bilateral trade (percent) 
 
 EU export to USA EU import from USA 
 EU US Sh. of export US EU Sh. of import 
 Export Subs. Tariff to USA Subsidy Tariff from US 
 
Agriculture and food             
Rice 0.0 4.4 2.9 0.0 72.6 24.2 
Wheat 3.4 2.8 0.1 6.6 1.2 33.2 
Other cereal grains 24.4 0.0 7.9 6.6 9.2 17.8 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 2.3 2.8 13.0 0.0 4.4 13.0 
Oil seeds 0.0 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.0 33.0 
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.2 8.5 0.0 60.7 0.0 
Plant-based fibres 0.0 0.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 6.8 
Other crops 0.0 2.2 18.5 0.0 11.3 17.2 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 0.0 45.5 0.0 0.6 52.7 
Other animals 0.7 0.4 5.6 0.0 1.3 18.5 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 
Wool and silk 0.0 1.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 10.7 
Bovine meat products 45.7 1.7 7.0 0.0 19.7 11.8 
Other meat products 0.0 1.5 6.8 0.0 24.2 20.2 
Vegetable oils and fats 0.0 1.4 19.4 0.0 5.1 7.7 
Dairy products 14.9 20.0 7.4 14.4 31.3 11.9 
Processed rice 33.6 7.1 6.2 0.0 93.5 11.5 
Sugar 54.5 17.7 6.8 0.0 24.0 3.5 
Other food products 3.2 5.4 11.7 0.0 15.2 11.3 
Beverages and tobacco 0.9 1.5 36.4 0.0 9.9 23.7 
       
Manufacturing             
Natural Resources 0.0 0.1 21.7 0.0 0.2 4.1 
Textiles 0.0 7.6 12.8 0.0 6.0 2.7 
Wearing Apparel 0.0 10.3 16.9 0.0 9.8 1.1 
Leather products 0.0 7.4 23.2 0.0 4.7 2.5 
Wood products 0.0 0.3 24.5 0.0 1.1 13.8 
Paper and publishing 0.0 0.0 16.8 0.0 0.0 29.2 
Petroleum and coal 0.0 1.9 7.6 0.0 0.8 3.7 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 0.0 2.1 30.4 0.0 2.7 34.6 
Other Mineral products 0.0 5.5 25.3 0.0 3.4 30.2 
Ferrous metals 0.0 0.2 20.7 0.0 0.8 5.3 
Other metals 0.0 1.7 19.9 0.0 1.8 18.3 
Metal products 0.0 2.6 18.2 0.0 2.6 17.4 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.0 2.3 37.0 0.0 6.2 25.1 
Other transport equipment 0.0 0.1 42.2 0.0 1.2 40.2 
Electronic equipment 0.0 0.3 16.5 0.0 0.3 16.7 
Other Machinery and Eq. 0.0 1.2 25.3 0.0 1.4 29.2 
Other manufacturing 0.0 1.4 29.4 0.0 0.9 12.9 
Services 0.0 0.0 30.1 0.0 0.0 30.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
42 FOI European Free Trade Areas as an alternative to Doha 
Table B2 Initial subsidies and tariffs in EU-Russian bilateral trade (percent) 
 
 EU export to Russia EU import from Russia 
 EU Russian Sh. of export Russian EU Sh. of import 
 Export subs. Tariff to Russia Subsidy Tariff from Russia 
 
Agriculture and food             
Rice 0.0 8.6 1.4 0.0 126.8 0.0 
Wheat 3.4 5.0 1.1 0.0 0.1 13.7 
Other cereal grains 24.3 5.0 5.1 0.0 11.7 8.4 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 2.3 11.7 14.6 0.0 2.9 0.3 
Oil seeds 0.0 4.9 3.3 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.9 
Plant-based fibres 0.0 2.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Other crops 0.0 8.4 8.1 0.0 1.3 0.1 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 1.8 1.4 0.0 2.5 1.3 
Other animals 0.7 8.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 1.6 -1.1 0.0 7.8 
Wool and silk 0.0 11.1 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bovine meat products 45.7 14.3 22.5 0.0 83.6 0.7 
Other meat products 0.0 18.6 8.7 0.0 19.1 1.4 
Vegetable oils and fats 0.0 13.1 12.1 0.0 1.3 0.4 
Dairy products 14.9 14.9 4.4 0.0 24.9 4.9 
Processed rice 33.6 8.1 2.0 0.0 158.2 0.1 
Sugar 53.0 34.9 3.8 0.0 55.8 0.2 
Other food products 3.2 12.6 7.0 0.0 11.0 2.6 
Beverages and tobacco 0.9 21.6 2.3 0.0 1.4 1.3 
       
Manufacturing             
Natural Resources 0.0 6.3 2.2 -9.4 0.0 20.9 
Textiles 0.0 13.3 4.1 -4.6 6.2 0.4 
Wearing Apparel 0.0 19.3 8.1 -4.6 8.5 0.3 
Leather products 0.0 17.8 5.3 -4.6 1.2 0.4 
Wood products 0.0 19.0 6.6 -2.0 0.5 5.3 
Paper and publishing 0.0 9.0 6.4 -2.0 0.0 6.2 
Petroleum and coal 0.0 5.0 2.7 -9.5 2.6 51.0 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 0.0 9.8 3.5 -3.3 1.6 3.8 
Other Mineral products 0.0 15.1 4.0 -7.3 1.0 2.9 
Ferrous metals 0.0 7.5 2.3 -1.6 0.9 16.1 
Other metals 0.0 12.7 2.0 -1.6 2.1 17.0 
Metal products 0.0 14.6 4.2 -5.0 2.7 3.3 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.0 16.3 3.3 -5.0 4.1 0.5 
Other transport equipment 0.0 10.2 0.7 -5.0 0.0 0.8 
Electronic equipment 0.0 6.6 4.3 -5.0 0.2 0.0 
Other Machinery and Eq. 0.0 7.9 3.5 -5.0 0.1 0.9 
Other manufacturing 0.0 14.6 1.2 -3.5 0.0 1.5 
Services 0.0 0.1 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 
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Table B3 Initial subsidies and tariffs in EU-Chinese bilateral trade (percent) 
 
 EU export to China EU import from China 
 EU Chinese Sh. of export Chinese EU Sh. of import 
 Export subs. Tariff to China Subsidy Tariff from China 
 
Agriculture and food       
Rice 0.0 0.7 1.3 0.0 58.5 0.7
Wheat 3.4 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.3 0.1
Other cereal grains 24.3 90.7 6.4 0.0 15.9 1.5
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 2.3 6.3 2.4 0.0 38.0 2.9
Oil seeds 0.0 9.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.1
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.3 1.8 0.0 54.9 9.2
Plant-based fibres 0.0 5.3 12.7 0.0 0.0 0.7
Other crops 0.0 3.2 2.7 0.0 2.5 0.7
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 0.2 3.9 0.0 8.0 0.1
Other animals 0.7 3.8 37.9 0.0 1.6 13.6
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 0.0 3.2
Wool and silk 0.0 1.8 38.3 0.0 0.0 0.6
Bovine meat products 45.7 8.5 3.2 0.0 18.1 0.1
Other meat products 0.0 7.3 21.5 0.0 8.2 1.5
Vegetable oils and fats 0.0 6.5 1.7 0.0 1.5 2.1
Dairy products 14.9 4.3 3.2 0.0 35.4 0.1
Processed rice 33.6 0.6 1.2 0.0 117.4 25.4
Sugar 56.0 11.9 1.8 0.0 127.0 0.0
Other food products 3.2 6.5 4.8 0.0 10.1 2.7
Beverages and tobacco 0.9 7.1 6.0 0.0 5.4 3.9
 
Manufacturing       
Natural Resources 0.0 1.8 15.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
Textiles 0.0 6.4 8.8 0.0 8.8 52.2
Wearing Apparel 0.0 8.1 6.1 0.0 10.5 59.7
Leather products 0.0 1.6 12.9 0.0 8.8 33.3
Wood products 0.0 2.9 7.0 0.0 0.4 16.6
Paper and publishing 0.0 3.6 5.3 0.0 0.0 5.5
Petroleum and coal -0.1 5.7 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.4
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 0.0 5.8 4.4 0.0 1.7 9.1
Other Mineral products 0.0 6.7 6.5 0.0 5.6 12.5
Ferrous metals 0.0 4.6 8.8 0.0 1.6 2.6
Other metals 0.0 3.0 11.7 0.0 1.7 1.3
Metal products 0.0 7.7 4.8 0.0 2.9 28.8
Motor vehicles and parts 0.0 11.9 6.2 0.0 0.1 1.6
Other transport equipment 0.0 2.1 4.8 0.0 0.5 10.2
Electronic equipment 0.0 1.2 17.8 0.0 1.0 32.4
Other Machinery and Eq. 0.0 6.6 8.9 0.0 0.4 18.6
Other manufacturing 0.0 8.5 5.1 0.0 2.3 36.2
Services 0.0 0.0 9.3 0.0 0.0 10.6
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Table B4  Initial EU subsidies and tariffs and multilateral trade scenario shocks 
(percent) 
  
 --------------- EU export -------------- ---------------- EU import ----------------
 EU Shock to Partner Shock to Partner Shock to EU Shock to
Export subs. Subsidy Tariff Tariff Subsidy Subsidy Tariff Tariff
  
Agriculture and food          
Rice 0.0 0.0 23.0 -2.9 0.0 0.0 54.0 -11.1
Wheat 3.4 -3.3 17.1 -1.7 2.2 -2.0 1.0 0.0
Other cereal grains 24.3 -19.6 17.1 -2.7 1.2 -1.1 16.7 -0.3
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 2.3 -2.3 16.0 -2.4 0.2 -0.1 16.2 -4.5
Oil seeds 0.0 0.0 12.6 -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.0 30.4 -3.5 0.0 0.0 20.2 -3.5
Plant-based fibres 0.0 0.0 1.7 -0.2 0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0
Other crops 0.0 0.0 8.5 -1.1 0.0 0.0 3.1 -0.9
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 0.0 3.6 -1.5 0.3 -0.2 3.4 -1.6
Other animals 0.7 -0.7 6.3 -0.8 0.0 0.0 1.2 -0.2
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wool and silk 0.0 0.0 3.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bovine meat products 45.7 -31.4 20.2 -1.5 0.1 -0.1 41.1 -13.8
Other meat products 0.0 0.0 31.2 -5.7 0.3 -0.2 20.4 -4.8
Vegetable oils and fats 0.0 0.0 11.3 -0.7 0.2 -0.2 13.2 -4.1
Dairy products 14.9 -13.0 19.7 -2.9 10.0 -7.8 35.7 -8.9
Processed rice 33.6 -25.1 14.9 -2.2 0.0 0.0 92.7 -23.3
Sugar 55.0 -34.8 33.6 -4.4 0.0 0.0 102.2 -22.4
Other food products 3.2 -3.1 14.3 -1.8 0.3 -0.3 8.0 -1.9
Beverages and tobacco 0.9 -0.9 14.8 -1.8 0.0 0.0 7.4 -2.1
  
Manufacturing          
Natural Resources 0.0 0.0 2.4 -0.4 -2.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Textiles 0.0 0.0 10.3 -3.5 -0.1 0.0 6.4 -2.7
Wearing Apparel 0.0 0.0 10.1 -3.3 -0.1 0.0 7.8 -3.6
Leather products 0.0 0.0 8.5 -2.9 -1.5 0.0 5.8 -2.1
Wood products 0.0 0.0 5.6 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.5 -0.1
Paper and publishing 0.0 0.0 4.5 -0.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Petroleum and coal -0.1 0.0 6.7 -0.8 -5.2 0.0 1.5 0.0
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 0.0 0.0 4.3 -0.9 -0.7 0.0 1.8 -0.5
Other Mineral products 0.0 0.0 7.5 -1.8 -0.2 0.0 2.5 -0.8
Ferrous metals 0.0 0.0 5.1 -1.2 -0.3 0.0 0.7 0.0
Other metals 0.0 0.0 5.2 -1.7 -0.3 0.0 1.0 -0.2
Metal products 0.0 0.0 6.7 -1.5 -0.2 0.0 1.9 -0.4
Motor vehicles and parts 0.0 0.0 7.8 -2.5 0.0 0.0 6.0 -2.5
Other transport equipment 0.0 0.0 2.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.4 -0.3
Electronic equipment 0.0 0.0 2.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.9 -0.3
Other Machinery and Eq. 0.0 0.0 4.4 -0.9 -0.1 0.0 1.0 -0.2
Other manufacturing 0.0 0.0 7.8 -3.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 -0.3
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Table B5 Impact on EU economy of US FTA (Million US$ / percent) 
  
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
  
Agriculture and food -902 -25.8 915 1.4 4569 8.2 -4599 -0.4 
Rice 54 1.5 20 24.4 204 351.6 -250 -27.4 
Wheat -16 -0.5 4 0.4 -49 -10.0 29 0.2 
Other cereal grains 21 0.6 -14 -2.0 6 -0.1 -78 -0.6 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts -7 -0.2 29 0.6 112 1.6 -113 -0.2 
Oil seeds -1 0.0 4 1.5 -11 -0.2 10 0.1 
Sugar cane, beeds 0 0.0 0 -0.2 0 0.0 -1 0.0 
Plant-based fibres 0 0.0 2 0.4 1 0.2 4 0.2 
Other crops -16 -0.5 253 3.6 594 8.4 -377 -0.7 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses -1 0.0 10 1.8 -3 -0.6 -200 -0.8 
Other animals -1 0.0 3 0.3 -4 -0.1 -348 -0.7 
Raw milk 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.2 0 0.0 
Wool and silk 0 0.0 0 0.1 -1 0.0 4 0.3 
Bovine meat products -129 -3.7 -72 -5.4 765 47.0 -946 -1.5 
Other meat products -254 -7.3 105 2.0 1010 101.9 -1046 -1.0 
Vegetable oils and fats -6 -0.2 29 1.8 28 1.7 -26 -0.1 
Dairy products -103 -3.0 174 5.2 381 19.6 -45 0.0 
Processed rice -93 -2.7 2 2.8 215 109.4 -207 -9.2 
Sugar -29 -0.8 10 3.6 60 5.0 0 0.0 
Other food products -327 -9.4 256 1.4 1058 6.0 -944 -0.3 
Beverages and tobacco 8 0.2 101 0.5 204 4.7 -64 0.0 
         
Manufacturing 4391 125.8 19879 2.7 15650 1.9 7701 0.2 
Natural Resources 31 0.9 -48 -0.1 5 0.2 -68 0.0 
Textiles 370 10.6 1550 8.4 581 1.6 1790 1.8 
Wearing Apparel 499 14.3 1605 16.7 336 0.8 1524 1.8 
Leather products 520 14.9 1788 14.6 344 2.1 1894 3.4 
Wood products -3 -0.1 35 0.2 154 1.2 -83 -0.1 
Paper and publishing 1 0.0 -38 -0.2 24 0.2 -22 0.0 
Petroleum and coal 7 0.2 55 0.5 -4 0.1 116 0.1 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 145 4.2 4321 3.3 3936 4.9 1195 0.2 
Other Mineral products 509 14.6 1518 6.9 736 5.4 974 0.4 
Ferrous metals 14 0.4 -13 0.0 55 0.5 -108 -0.1 
Other metals 83 2.4 415 2.5 466 2.2 -38 0.0 
Metal products 110 3.1 526 3.1 570 3.1 20 0.0 
Motor vehicles and parts 544 15.6 3268 4.4 3083 8.6 690 0.1 
Other transport equipment 16 0.5 164 0.4 867 2.0 -701 -0.6 
Electronic equipment 34 1.0 -26 0.0 463 0.4 -704 -0.2 
Other Machinery and Eq. 1043 29.9 3691 1.9 3698 2.4 197 0.0 
Other manufacturing 470 13.5 1066 2.9 336 0.8 1024 0.5 
Services 0 0.0 -713 -0.2 435 0.2 1492 0.0 
         
Total 3490 100.0 20081 1.8 20654 1.7 4595 0.0 
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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Table B6 Impact on EU economy of Russian FTA (Million US$ / percent) 
 
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
 
Agriculture and food 617 4.6 1560 2.2 1679 3.1 868 0.1
Rice 4 0.0 2 2.8 20 34.7 -21 -2.3
Wheat 1 0.0 -18 -1.0 4 0.8 3 0.0
Other cereal grains 20 0.2 -9 -1.8 11 2.0 -2 0.0
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 2 0.0 149 3.6 42 0.7 132 0.2
Oil seeds -1 0.0 0 -0.2 22 0.5 -3 0.0
Sugar cane, beeds 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.1 2 0.1
Plant-based fibres 0 0.0 -2 -0.3 3 0.3 -1 -0.1
Other crops -4 0.0 107 1.3 75 1.2 85 0.2
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0 0.0 4 0.8 -7 -1.0 -341 -1.4
Other animals -1 0.0 0 -0.1 13 0.9 377 0.7
Raw milk 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.2 0 0.0
Wool and silk 0 0.0 4 0.8 4 0.7 1 0.1
Bovine meat products 180 1.3 -186 -16.7 781 48.0 -1210 -1.9
Other meat products 257 1.9 910 15.5 74 7.6 1090 1.0
Vegetable oils and fats 31 0.2 119 6.9 15 1.0 174 0.4
Dairy products 5 0.0 71 2.3 332 21.4 -47 0.0
Processed rice -3 0.0 -1 -1.1 11 5.7 -9 -0.4
Sugar 1 0.0 -1 -1.5 29 2.4 0 0.0
Other food products 80 0.6 302 1.6 238 1.4 375 0.1
Beverages and tobacco 44 0.3 109 0.6 13 0.3 264 0.2
 
Manufacturing 12800 95.3 10577 1.4 9026 1.5 5409 0.1
Natural Resources 6222 46.3 1961 11.1 967 2.9 -531 -0.3
Textiles 143 1.1 473 2.5 398 1.1 450 0.4
Wearing Apparel 266 2.0 963 9.9 364 0.8 800 0.9
Leather products 162 1.2 630 5.1 193 1.2 631 1.1
Wood products 225 1.7 574 3.2 136 1.1 789 0.5
Paper and publishing 93 0.7 235 1.1 188 1.5 375 0.1
Petroleum and coal 3088 23.0 465 4.2 955 10.0 -268 -0.2
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 527 3.9 1856 1.5 618 1.0 2988 0.4
Other Mineral products 184 1.4 466 2.1 203 1.8 506 0.2
Ferrous metals 105 0.8 164 0.9 176 1.6 4 0.0
Other metals 232 1.7 454 2.8 689 3.4 -292 -0.3
Metal products 180 1.3 376 2.1 478 2.9 86 0.0
Motor vehicles and parts 278 2.1 1061 1.3 347 1.1 1352 0.3
Other transport equipment 119 0.9 -97 -0.3 315 0.8 -428 -0.4
Electronic equipment 138 1.0 123 0.1 958 0.7 -604 -0.2
Other Machinery and Eq. 680 5.1 518 0.2 1802 1.3 -865 -0.1
Other manufacturing 157 1.2 353 1.0 239 0.7 419 0.2
Services 18 0.1 -1207 -0.4 1462 0.4 9872 0.1
 
Total 13433 100.0 10930 0.9 12166 1.3 16150 0.1
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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Table B7 Impact on EU economy of Chinese FTA (Million US$ / percent) 
 
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
 
Agriculture and food 705 15.4 1552 0.1 1137 2.1 942 0.1
Rice 10 0.2 4 5.5 19 35.3 -99 -10.9
Wheat 0 0.0 -22 -1.2 5 0.9 -7 -0.1
Other cereal grains -4 -0.1 158 9.4 10 1.9 160 1.2
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 388 8.5 23 0.7 392 5.1 -415 -0.8
Oil seeds 0 0.0 1 0.3 13 0.2 4 0.1
Sugar cane, beeds 0 0.0 0 -0.1 0 0.0 1 0.0
Plant-based fibres -1 0.0 28 4.3 -6 -0.3 21 1.4
Other crops 0 0.0 21 0.2 15 0.3 -32 -0.1
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0 0.0 0 0.1 0 0.0 -43 -0.2
Other animals -5 -0.1 101 3.5 12 0.5 487 1.0
Raw milk 0 0.0 0 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0
Wool and silk 1 0.0 66 10.9 -4 -0.8 62 5.1
Bovine meat products 32 0.7 -35 -2.7 64 4.0 -158 -0.2
Other meat products 80 1.7 963 16.5 23 2.4 1063 1.0
Vegetable oils and fats 3 0.1 17 1.1 4 0.3 40 0.1
Dairy products 3 0.1 -35 -1.5 13 0.9 -21 0.0
Processed rice 121 2.6 1 0.8 373 188.0 -451 -20.0
Sugar 1 0.0 -1 -0.3 26 2.1 0 0.0
Other food products 52 1.1 149 0.8 158 0.9 184 0.1
Beverages and tobacco 26 0.6 115 0.8 19 0.5 146 0.1
 
Manufacturing 3876 84.6 23102 3.1 24519 2.8 5945 0.1
Natural Resources -83 -1.8 413 2.1 440 0.4 80 0.0
Textiles 104 2.3 1746 10.2 5131 12.5 -5070 -5.1
Wearing Apparel -1136 -24.8 914 10.3 8044 15.5 -6180 -7.3
Leather products 48 1.0 632 5.5 2290 12.7 -1797 -3.2
Wood products 45 1.0 243 1.4 33 0.2 361 0.2
Paper and publishing 57 1.3 180 0.9 40 0.3 226 0.1
Petroleum and coal -16 -0.3 53 0.4 15 0.1 120 0.1
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 675 14.7 2199 1.7 707 0.9 1770 0.2
Other Mineral products 154 3.4 577 2.6 527 3.8 287 0.1
Ferrous metals 120 2.6 419 2.1 118 1.0 1160 0.7
Other metals 112 2.4 430 2.5 202 1.0 797 0.8
Metal products 157 3.4 497 2.9 1001 5.3 476 0.2
Motor vehicles and parts 532 11.6 2340 3.0 161 0.5 3079 0.6
Other transport equipment 101 2.2 306 0.7 168 0.4 252 0.2
Electronic equipment 723 15.8 1312 1.9 2612 1.7 -407 -0.1
Other Machinery and Eq. 2011 43.9 9047 4.6 1376 0.9 9918 1.3
Other manufacturing 271 5.9 1793 4.9 1653 3.5 874 0.4
Services 0 0.0 -89 0.0 400 0.1 4154 0.0
 
Total 4581 100 24566 2.1 26057 2.0 11041 0.1
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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Table B8 Impact on EU economy of Doha scenario (Million US$ / percent) 
 
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
 
Agriculture and food 700 9.1 -3100 -0.34 6277 2.07 -14101 -1.32 
Rice 1497 19.5 218 235.1 102 278.3 -64 -7.0 
Wheat -387 -5.0 -23 -3.0 -26 -3.0 -113 -0.8 
Other cereal grains -10 -0.1 -217 -33.7 -27 -4.9 -532 -3.9 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 356 4.6 -80 -3.9 927 12.4 -1269 -2.3 
Oil seeds -790 -10.3 -85 -25.0 -167 -3.0 -186 -2.5 
Sugar cane, beeds 0 0.0 0 -0.3 -1 -0.4 -4 -0.1 
Plant-based fibres -8 -0.1 -5 -0.1 -15 1.6 -36 -2.4 
Other crops -88 -1.1 -841 -10.5 422 8.1 -1567 -2.8 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses -3 0.0 85 14.4 -16 -2.3 -1041 -4.2 
Other animals -62 -0.8 14 0.7 -17 -0.1 -146 -0.3 
Raw milk 0 0.0 -3 0.8 -2 1.2 0 0.0 
Wool and silk -1 0.0 -23 -3.3 -40 -5.2 -11 -0.9 
Bovine meat products 789 10.3 -1182 -92.0 2288 141.2 -5237 -8.2 
Other meat products -1299 -16.9 468 8.6 640 68.1 -280 -0.3 
Vegetable oils and fats 100 1.3 -102 -5.5 547 35.1 -899 -2.0 
Dairy products 356 4.6 -770 -33.8 361 20.8 -534 -0.5 
Processed rice -436 -5.7 -85 -77.8 199 125.6 -513 -22.8 
Sugar 640 8.3 -179 -58.1 92 7.8 -3 0.0 
Other food products -43 -0.6 -518 -5.6 838 5.1 -1941 -0.7 
Beverages and tobacco 88 1.1 229 1.1 171 4.2 275 0.2 
         
Manufacturing 6983 90.9 33391 4.5 29311 3.4 12487 0.3 
Natural Resources -273 -3.6 742 3.2 1123 0.4 353 0.2 
Textiles 1099 14.3 2857 15.9 3275 8.2 -901 -0.9 
Wearing Apparel 645 8.4 979 10.6 4546 8.9 -3140 -3.7 
Leather products 900 11.7 927 7.8 1627 9.4 -733 -1.3 
Wood products 189 2.5 587 3.3 93 0.6 922 0.6 
Paper and publishing 210 2.7 715 3.5 99 0.7 757 0.2 
Petroleum and coal -265 -3.5 486 2.7 118 0.4 300 0.2 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics -247 -3.2 2059 1.6 2931 3.8 -1229 -0.2 
Other Mineral products 379 4.9 1434 6.4 595 4.3 1062 0.5 
Ferrous metals 98 1.3 917 4.6 149 1.2 1574 0.9 
Other metals 117 1.5 1719 10.1 690 3.1 1839 1.8 
Metal products 347 4.5 1139 6.7 522 2.7 1003 0.3 
Motor vehicles and parts 918 11.9 4332 5.7 4996 14.1 -505 -0.1 
Other transport equipment 54 0.7 -377 -0.8 718 1.7 -1204 -1.1 
Electronic equipment 243 3.2 352 0.5 2096 1.3 -1702 -0.5 
Other Machinery and Eq. 1048 13.6 5945 3.0 2305 1.5 4426 0.6 
Other manufacturing 1520 19.8 8577 22.7 3428 7.5 9666 4.3 
Services 0 0.0 1165 0.3 520 0.1 6605 0.1 
         
Total 7,672 100   2.61   2.80   0.03 
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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Appendix C: Detailed tables at sectoral level, Danish results 
 
Table C1 Impact on Danish economy of US FTA scenario (Million US$ / percent) 
 
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
 
Agriculture and food -40 -95 -68.2  17.9  -131.6  
Rice 2.0 4.9 -0.4 -19.4 -0.1 -2.5 -0.4 -18.9 
Wheat 0.1 0.3 1.9 1.7 -0.2 -0.5 0.5 0.1 
Other cereal grains 0.6 1.3 -1.6 -1.1 0.0 0.1 -3.4 -0.7 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 
Oil seeds 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.7 
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Plant-based fibres 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1 
Other crops -7.7 -18.6 -11.6 -0.7 3.5 0.8 -18.4 -0.9 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.6 -0.1 -2.0 -4.4 -3.0 
Other animals -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -1.0 -0.3 -15.0 -0.5 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Wool and silk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Bovine meat products 2.0 4.7 -4.6 -2.5 8.8 3.8 -17.5 -3.6 
Other meat products -24.1 -58.0 -31.5 -0.8 0.1 0.2 -35.2 -0.7 
Vegetable oils and fats -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 
Dairy products -4.9 -11.7 5.5 0.4 6.9 2.5 -0.1 0.0 
Processed rice -0.5 -1.1 -0.5 -21.6 -0.1 0.2 -0.7 -10.5 
Sugar 0.9 2.1 -0.4 -2.3 -1.7 -1.4 0.0 0.0 
Other food products -7.9 -19.1 -24.2 -0.9 3.4 0.3 -36.4 -0.6 
Beverages and tobacco 0.2 0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 
         
Manufacturing -1.9 -5 104.9  12.2  83.3  
Natural Resources 0.2 0.5 1.4 0.1 -5.9 -0.1 -1.2 0.0 
Textiles -0.4 -1.0 12.8 1.2 -0.8 0.5 13.5 0.9 
Wearing Apparel -0.6 -1.5 5.5 0.7 4.3 0.1 5.4 0.4 
Leather products 0.8 1.9 20.6 6.3 -0.4 0.7 22.3 4.2 
Wood products 0.1 0.3 4.7 0.2 3.4 0.3 4.9 0.2 
Paper and publishing 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 4.5 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 
Petroleum and coal 0.1 0.4 2.3 0.3 -1.4 0.0 2.1 0.1 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics -12.2 -29.3 -7.0 -0.1 -1.7 0.1 -14.5 -0.2 
Other Mineral products -1.8 -4.3 -3.5 -0.5 2.2 0.1 -6.5 -0.2 
Ferrous metals 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Other metals -0.9 -2.1 -2.5 -0.6 0.9 0.1 -2.7 -0.5 
Metal products 0.7 1.7 5.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 5.0 0.1 
Motor vehicles and parts -3.1 -7.3 -7.6 -0.9 1.3 0.1 -10.5 -0.4 
Other transport equipment 1.0 2.5 -3.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -3.3 -0.5 
Electronic equipment 1.0 2.4 5.6 0.3 -1.9 0.1 6.8 0.2 
Other Machinery and Eq. 14.5 34.7 69.4 0.8 1.0 0.1 63.8 0.5 
Other manufacturing -1.5 -3.7 0.3 0.1 6.1 0.2 -1.3 0.0 
Services 0.0 0.0 34.4 0.1 0.9 -0.1 -30.3 0.0 
         
Total -41.6 100 36.7   30.1   -48.3   
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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Table C2 Impact on Danish economy of Russian FTA scenario (Million US$ / per-
cent) 
  
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
  
Agriculture and food 43 73 114.8  27.0  163.2  
Rice 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -15.1 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -14.4 
Wheat 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -1.9 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.1 
Other cereal grains 0.7 1.2 -4.7 -3.1 0.2 0.3 -2.3 -0.5 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts -0.5 -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Oil seeds 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Plant-based fibres 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.6 
Other crops -0.1 -0.1 -3.6 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -3.0 -0.1 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.2 -0.1 -1.5 -3.5 -2.4 
Other animals 0.2 0.3 -1.1 -0.1 2.1 1.2 46.0 1.5 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Wool and silk 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 -1.0 
Bovine meat products -0.2 -0.4 -14.0 -7.8 0.9 0.3 -15.1 -3.1 
Other meat products 48.8 82.0 111.9 2.9 1.0 0.3 117.1 2.2 
Vegetable oils and fats -0.2 -0.4 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.9 1.9 0.6 
Dairy products -9.8 -16.4 0.2 0.0 3.2 1.9 -0.7 0.0 
Processed rice 0.1 0.2 0.0 -1.7 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -1.1 
Sugar 0.3 0.5 -0.5 -2.9 0.7 1.1 0.0 0.0 
Other food products 4.5 7.6 27.1 1.0 16.4 0.9 21.0 0.4 
Beverages and tobacco -0.3 -0.5 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.8 0.1 
         
Manufacturing 16.3 27 -24.8  -5.0  -36.4  
Natural Resources 19.7 33.2 -8.4 -0.4 -25.0 -0.2 -9.2 -0.3 
Textiles 0.7 1.2 6.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 6.3 0.4 
Wearing Apparel -0.8 -1.4 3.3 0.4 2.6 0.2 2.3 0.2 
Leather products -0.2 -0.3 10.5 3.2 2.2 0.3 11.6 2.2 
Wood products 2.1 3.5 16.1 0.7 2.1 0.5 16.3 0.5 
Paper and publishing -0.3 -0.5 0.8 0.1 7.3 0.1 1.4 0.0 
Petroleum and coal -9.7 -16.2 -14.0 -1.8 2.0 0.0 -11.2 -0.7 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics -3.8 -6.5 -41.8 -0.7 -6.7 0.1 -51.3 -0.5 
Other Mineral products 1.8 3.0 2.9 0.5 -2.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Ferrous metals 3.2 5.4 -1.3 -0.3 1.5 0.0 -2.0 -0.3 
Other metals 4.1 6.9 1.7 0.4 -0.7 0.1 1.3 0.2 
Metal products -0.3 -0.5 -2.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -1.7 0.0 
Motor vehicles and parts -3.9 -6.5 3.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 3.0 0.1 
Other transport equipment -0.3 -0.5 -2.7 -0.4 1.6 0.0 -2.7 -0.4 
Electronic equipment -0.3 -0.5 -1.4 -0.1 0.4 0.0 -2.6 -0.1 
Other Machinery and Eq. 3.8 6.4 0.4 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Other manufacturing 0.4 0.7 2.6 0.5 6.2 0.2 1.9 0.1 
Services -0.3 -0.5 -34.5 -0.1 1.5 0.1 -25.1 0.0 
         
Total 59.8 100 90.0   22.0   126.8   
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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Table C3 Impact on Danish economy of Chinese FTA scenario (Million US$ / per-
cent) 
 
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
 
Agriculture and food 78 60 128.0  13.9  207.0  
Rice 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -15.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -14.5 
Wheat 0.0 0.0 -3.3 -3.1 0.4 1.3 0.2 0.1 
Other cereal grains 0.0 0.0 -1.2 -0.8 0.2 0.2 2.9 0.6 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 2.8 2.1 -1.3 -1.1 0.5 0.2 -2.0 -0.7 
Oil seeds 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -1.1 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Plant-based fibres -0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -1.0 
Other crops -0.4 -0.3 -14.8 -0.9 -2.1 -0.5 -14.8 -0.7 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.6 -1.1 
Other animals 1.3 1.0 5.1 0.6 3.0 1.6 68.1 2.3 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Wool and silk 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -0.2 -2.8 0.0 -0.8 
Bovine meat products -0.9 -0.7 -6.4 -3.6 1.6 0.7 -5.8 -1.2 
Other meat products 68.1 52.2 150.7 3.9 2.7 0.9 156.8 2.9 
Vegetable oils and fats 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.3 
Dairy products -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 
Processed rice 3.5 2.7 -0.9 -42.6 -0.6 -3.6 -2.2 -34.4 
Sugar 0.4 0.3 -0.4 -2.0 0.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 
Other food products 4.2 3.2 2.7 0.1 5.6 0.3 5.5 0.1 
Beverages and tobacco -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
         
Manufacturing 52.7 40 160.6  199.6  39.6  
Natural Resources -1.4 -1.1 -1.7 -0.1 0.8 0.1 -0.8 0.0 
Textiles 11.8 9.1 -18.7 -1.7 0.4 -0.6 -55.3 -3.9 
Wearing Apparel -17.5 -13.4 -40.6 -4.8 -6.6 6.1 -96.5 -7.8 
Leather products 8.4 6.4 -16.2 -5.0 108.7 0.9 -24.9 -4.7 
Wood products -0.5 -0.4 1.9 0.1 4.6 -0.2 2.4 0.1 
Paper and publishing 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 -4.0 0.1 1.3 0.0 
Petroleum and coal 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.1 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 2.8 2.1 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 -4.2 0.0 
Other Mineral products 0.6 0.4 -2.0 -0.3 -0.6 0.4 -6.8 -0.2 
Ferrous metals -0.4 -0.3 3.0 0.6 4.3 0.6 3.6 0.5 
Other metals -0.2 -0.1 4.6 1.1 6.3 0.5 4.9 0.9 
Metal products 4.8 3.7 2.3 0.2 2.7 1.1 3.7 0.1 
Motor vehicles and parts -6.2 -4.8 -1.9 -0.2 14.2 0.2 -1.6 -0.1 
Other transport equipment 2.2 1.7 4.0 0.6 4.1 0.2 4.0 0.6 
Electronic equipment 8.2 6.3 -11.8 -0.6 3.9 0.5 -17.9 -0.5 
Other Machinery and Eq. 39.9 30.6 239.8 2.7 21.5 0.5 243.8 1.9 
Other manufacturing 0.1 0.1 -4.4 -0.8 37.1 1.3 -18.0 -0.7 
Services 0.0 0.0 -59.7 -0.2 12.6 0.3 -55.2 0.0 
         
Total 130.4 100 288.6   213.4   246.7   
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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Table C4 Impact on Danish economy of Doha scenario (Million US$ / percent) 
 
 Welfarea Export Import Production 
 Value Share Value % Value % Value % 
 
Agriculture and food 22 20 -127.9  -35.8  -74.5  
Rice -43.6 -40.2 -1.3 -69.0 -0.4 -13.0 -1.3 -66.4 
Wheat -8.6 -7.9 2.9 2.7 -0.1 0.8 6.4 1.4 
Other cereal grains -8.6 -7.9 -20.8 -13.7 -1.1 -0.7 -19.4 -3.9 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 3.4 3.1 -2.3 -1.9 -1.6 0.0 -3.4 -1.3 
Oil seeds -14.2 -13.0 -2.9 -9.5 -3.8 -3.2 -3.0 -6.1 
Sugar cane, beeds 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Plant-based fibres 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -9.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -9.1 
Other crops -10.2 -9.4 -161.5 -9.6 -17.5 -2.6 -166.0 -8.1 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.0 -0.4 -8.9 -21.5 -14.7 
Other animals -3.3 -3.1 0.7 0.1 2.9 2.9 109.5 3.7 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -0.1 1.8 0.0 0.0 
Wool and silk 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -4.2 -0.2 -2.4 -0.1 -2.9 
Bovine meat products -14.8 -13.6 -72.7 -40.7 2.5 1.8 -85.2 -17.5 
Other meat products 135.0 124.2 265.8 6.9 2.9 1.5 271.5 5.1 
Vegetable oils and fats 0.2 0.2 -6.0 -7.9 2.0 4.6 -9.1 -2.7 
Dairy products -13.1 -12.0 -1.4 -0.1 -10.5 -1.3 -4.9 -0.1 
Processed rice -20.3 -18.7 -1.6 -73.4 -3.2 -15.5 -2.9 -44.6 
Sugar 15.9 14.6 -3.8 -21.2 -11.9 -3.4 -0.4 -0.1 
Other food products 1.6 1.5 -122.6 -4.5 7.4 1.0 -146.8 -2.6 
Beverages and tobacco 2.5 2.3 -0.5 -0.1 -2.4 -0.1 2.2 0.1 
         
Manufacturing 86.7 80 -25.3  61.3  -169.1  
Natural Resources -0.2 -0.2 22.8 1.0 11.8 0.0 4.0 0.1 
Textiles 18.5 17.0 -30.8 -2.9 -2.4 -1.6 -54.1 -3.8 
Wearing Apparel 4.4 4.0 -48.5 -5.8 -19.6 2.9 -80.0 -6.5 
Leather products 17.1 15.8 -17.6 -5.4 52.2 0.4 -24.8 -4.7 
Wood products 1.6 1.4 14.9 0.6 1.2 -0.1 16.5 0.5 
Paper and publishing 0.4 0.4 5.1 0.7 0.3 -0.2 3.3 0.0 
Petroleum and coal -1.9 -1.8 7.6 1.0 -0.8 -0.1 8.1 0.5 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics -7.8 -7.2 -26.2 -0.4 3.6 -0.4 -37.8 -0.4 
Other Mineral products 2.6 2.4 3.7 0.6 -19.3 0.1 2.1 0.1 
Ferrous metals 0.8 0.7 8.8 1.7 1.7 0.0 8.8 1.3 
Other metals -0.9 -0.8 14.3 3.4 0.3 0.4 14.6 2.8 
Metal products 4.0 3.6 5.2 0.5 2.3 0.2 -0.6 0.0 
Motor vehicles and parts 22.2 20.5 -30.5 -3.5 3.5 0.6 -44.7 -1.9 
Other transport equipment 11.2 10.3 6.9 1.1 10.7 0.1 6.8 1.1 
Electronic equipment 6.8 6.3 -17.9 -0.9 1.4 0.1 -25.6 -0.7 
Other Machinery and Eq. 18.8 17.3 61.3 0.7 4.9 0.1 42.7 0.3 
Other manufacturing -10.8 -10.0 -4.3 -0.8 9.4 0.2 -8.4 -0.3 
Services 0.3 0.3 250.3 0.9 2.8 0.1 185.1 0.1 
         
Total 108.4 100 -153.2   25.5   -243.5   
 
a The welfare column describes the welfare implications for the EU of liberalisation in each economic sector, 
measured in value (Million US$) and as a share of total economy-wide effects. 
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